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EXTRATERRITORIAL CONFUSION:  THE 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BOWMAN AND MORRISON AND A REVISED 
APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, Ramzi Yousef planted a “test bomb” aboard an international 
flight from the Philippines to Japan.1  During a layover, Yousef 
disembarked the plane.2  On the second leg of the flight, the test bomb 
detonated successfully, resulting in the death of a Japanese passenger 
and the injury of several other innocent civilians.3 
Authorities eventually detained Yousef, and an investigation 
indicated that the test bomb was practice for a more devious plan, in 
which Yousef intended to place similar bombs onboard several United 
States-bound commercial aircraft.4  Yousef was extradited to the United 
States and found guilty of planting and detonating the bomb on the 
Philippine commercial flight.5  Yousef challenged this conviction, 
questioning how he could be charged for a bombing that took place 
wholly outside of the United States in which none of the victims were 
U.S. citizens or residents.6  The United States’s answer to his challenge 
was extraterritoriality.7 
                                                 
1 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003).  In preparation for this 
bombing, Yousef and several other co-conspirators bombed a movie theater in Manila, 
resulting in the injury of several patrons.  Id. at 79. 
2 Id. at 81.  Yousef exited the plane during a layover in Cebu, another city located in the 
Philippines.  Id. 
3 Id. at 79. 
4 See id. at 81–82, 110 (“The bombing of the Philippine Airlines flight at issue in Count 
Nineteen, which killed one Japanese national and maimed another, was merely a test-run 
that Yousef executed to ensure that the tactics and devices the conspirators planned to use 
on United States aircraft operated properly.”). 
5 Id. at 80, 82.  Yousef was convicted and found guilty of other offenses as well, 
including the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.  Id. at 79–80. 
6 Id. at 88.  For this crime, Yousef was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 32(b), which 
allows for the prosecution of those placing bombs on foreign, civilian aircraft regardless of 
where the act is committed.  Id.  § 32(b) prescribes jurisdiction over foreign offenders if they 
are “found within the United States.”  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)).  Yousef argued that he 
was not “found in the United States” but was instead extradited against his will for the 
perpetration of other crimes; however, the court found the extradition was sufficient to 
fulfill this requirement.  Id. at 88, 90. 
7 Id. at 87–88.  Extraterritoriality is the exercise of enforcing a law beyond a nation’s 
boundaries.  See infra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of 
extraterritoriality).  While 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) explicitly prescribes extraterritoriality, Yousef 
challenged such extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Id. at 91.  The court found jurisdiction proper 
under the protective principle of international law.  Id. at 91–92. 
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Traditionally, the United States has combated some forms of 
international conduct by giving extraterritorial effect to some federal 
laws.8  Extraterritoriality, the exercise of enforcing a law beyond national 
boundaries, is by no means a new issue; however, it is one that has 
garnered some attention as of late.9  In the last twenty years, the world 
has become more global, and it is common for the substance of many 
crimes to have connections in more than one country.10  However, 
extraterritoriality regularly results in an encroachment upon another 
nation’s sovereignty.11 
The United States’s treatment of extraterritoriality is inconsistent.12  
The United States, in its early beginnings, appeared to foster 
                                                 
8 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 94–166, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 7 (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
94-166.pdf (explaining how the “nature and purpose of a statute” may call for it to apply 
extraterritorially); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law:  A New Rule for 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 111–14 (2010) (discussing the 
United States’s use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish crimes abroad that have a 
harmful effect on the nation).  Throughout this Note, I will be using the term 
“geoambiguous” to characterize laws that are nondescript in their extraterritorial reach.  I 
have borrowed this term from Professor Jeffrey A. Meyer’s article, Dual Illegality and 
Geoambiguous Law:  A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law.  Id. at 114.  
9 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 122–24 (discussing how the development of international 
organizations, borders, and legal norms leads to an inevitable increase in extraterritorial 
conduct).  Extraterritorially applying laws to combat heinous conduct does not always 
result in an international uproar, but is nevertheless a contentious issue.  See Anthony J. 
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1048–49 (2011) 
(discussing the controversial extraterritorial extension of federal statutes by Congress).  
Extraterritoriality is especially controversial when it is prescribed unilaterally or when a 
federal statute is silent on its geographic scope.  Id.  This Note focuses solely on the United 
States’s approach to extraterritoriality.  A comparative analysis with other nations is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
10 See Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-
First Century:  Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 592 (2007) 
(discussing how the world has become increasingly interconnected, resulting in what 
President George H.W. Bush described as a type of “new world order”). 
11 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (discussing the 
importance of sovereignty and the ability of nations to govern their own laws).  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction can encroach upon a nation’s sovereignty and deny a nation its 
full rights.  Id.  Extraterritoriality is often seen as a controversial means of enforcing foreign 
policy.  See Charles Tait Graves, Extraterritoriality and Its Limits:  The Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 1996, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 715, 716 (1998) (explaining that 
extraterritoriality is recognized in limited contexts).  See generally Jordan J. Paust, The 
Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanactions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1535 (2009) (highlighting some of the controversial tactics that the Bush administration 
used to gain jurisdiction over alleged terrorists).  
12 John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. U. L. 
REV. 635, 640 (2011).  Such an inconsistency makes the standards of overcoming the 
presumption against extraterritoriality difficult to define.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 164. 
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international law and restrained its use of extraterritoriality.13  This 
approach changed in the 1920s, and courts suddenly became more lax in 
allowing laws, particularly criminal laws, to apply extraterritorially.14  
But the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd. appears to reinforce a strict presumption against 
extraterritoriality.15  It seems that the only thing consistent is the courts’ 
inability to effectively define and manage the limitations of 
extraterritoriality.16 
The emergence of new global issues has brought the presumption 
against extraterritoriality under fire.17  Crimes are becoming more 
intricate and complex, and continual developments call for the United 
States to alter the way it applies federal laws extraterritorially.18  To 
                                                 
13 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) 
(construing the Charming Betsy canon, which states that “an act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”); see 
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“All legislation is prima facie 
territorial.” (quoting Ex parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499 
(1859); People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596)).  The Charming Betsy doctrine states 
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”  Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.  The Charming Betsy 
doctrine is considered an early example of a presumption against extraterritoriality.  John 
H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 371 (2010). 
14 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (allowing the government to 
protect itself from obstruction of fraud by using extraterritorial application).  Bowman has 
consistently been the precedent used to apply laws extraterritorially.  See Zachary D. 
Clopton, Bowman Lives:  The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 167 & n.125 (2011) (discussing 
cases and situations that cite Bowman in order to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
15 See 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”). 
16 See Knox, supra note 12, at 650 (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
17 See Stephen I. Adler, Comment, Fighting Terrorism in the New Age:  A Call for 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Terrorists, 18 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 171, 173–74 (2006) (discussing 
emerging global issues that may become problematic for the United States).  Because of 
heightened dangers within modern society, including the war on drugs and war on terror, 
some individuals have called for lighter restraints on the United States’s approach to 
extraterritoriality.  Id. 
18 See Phillip R. Trimble, Commentary, The Supreme Court and International Law:  The 
Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 57 (1995) (asserting that, as 
technology advances, government regulation of private behavior is imperative).  Paul 
Schiff Berman has noted: 
[T]he growth of global communications technologies, the rise of 
multinational corporate entities with no significant territorial center of 
gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean 
that many jurisdictions will feel effects of activities around the globe, 
leading inevitably to multiple assertions of legal authority over the 
same act, without regard to territorial location. 
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007). 
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properly combat such issues without overstepping congressional 
authority, this Note endorses a new approach to extraterritorially 
applying federal laws—one that allows the United States to adequately 
maintain national security and combat criminal offenses that specifically 
target the United States and its citizens while simultaneously minimizing 
unexpressed statutory interpretations and encroachment on the 
sovereignty of other nations. 
This Note first discusses the meaning, history, and development of 
extraterritoriality within the United States.19  Second, this Note analyzes 
the treatment of the presumption against extraterritoriality, why its 
application reflects courts’ public policy concerns, and why international 
principles of law have been abused, resulting in increased extraterritorial 
interpretation.20  Finally, this Note provides a solution to 
extraterritoriality by endorsing a Modified-Exception Test, which 
emphasizes national security and promotes a clear statement, literal 
reading of statutes while providing an exception for extraterritorial 
application.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Extraterritoriality is a beneficial means of governmental assertion of 
authority over international conduct that causes domestic harm.22  Part 
II.A first discusses statutory construction and the definition of 
extraterritoriality, as well as the traditional approaches to interpreting 
the extraterritorial reach of geographically silent statutes.23  Second, Part 
II.B provides the history of extraterritorial application of federal laws 
that are silent in their territorial scope.24  Finally, Part II.C discusses the 
current state of extraterritoriality.25 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II (discussing the background and history of extraterritoriality). 
20 See infra Part III (explaining why the Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. is facially a strong policy, but fails to foster 
consistent, predictable results). 
21 See infra Part IV (creating a new test that balances the approaches of Morrison and 
Bowman while giving full consideration to the conduct in question and the contemplation 
of the actor). 
22 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (noting that the government has 
the right to protect itself and its property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 33(1) (1965) (noting the state’s ability to protect itself from threats to its 
security). 
23 See infra Part II.A (explaining the definition of extraterritoriality and its effects on the 
sovereignty of other nations). 
24 See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of extraterritoriality and the effect that 
Morrison may have on such application). 
25 See infra Part II.C (discussing the current state of extraterritoriality and the unclear 
effect of Morrison on Bowman and the treatment of criminal statutes). 
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A. The Precise Meaning of Extraterritoriality and the Issue of Statutory 
Construction 
A law is extraterritorial when it regulates activities beyond a nation’s 
borders.26  Congress has the ability to explicitly construct laws to apply 
extraterritorially; however, extraterritoriality is problematic when a 
statute is silent on the issue.27  The general relationship between 
extraterritoriality and national sovereignty is complex, and courts have 
yet to find a uniformed balance.28  A state’s sovereignty is built on the 
idea of autonomy and the ability to regulate conduct within its borders.29  
Extraterritoriality often involves an invasion of sovereignty, resulting in 
strained relations between states.30  The seriousness of the crime, even if 
                                                 
26 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 123 (defining the difference between territorial and 
extraterritorial laws).  Extraterritorial laws regulate conduct outside of a nation-state’s 
borders, regardless of whether or not an offense was committed by a national or an alien.  
Id.  Extraterritoriality transforms laws from national to international in nature.  See also 
Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:  Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 127–28 (2007) 
(discussing the relationship between prescriptive jurisdiction and international law). 
27 Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49.  Determining the territorial scope of a statute is 
problematic when a law is geoambiguous or lacks content indicating extraterritorial 
applicability.  See id. (noting that courts sometimes allow U.S. law to apply extraterritorially 
even without explicit statutory language or history).  Nevertheless, even when a statute 
explicitly contains language allowing for extraterritorial application, prescription, and 
enforcement, it may still violate international law if adequate jurisdiction is lacking.  
Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads:  An Intersection Between Public 
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 291 (1982). 
28 Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (noting 
that extraterritorial application of laws invades the rights of other nations, thus denying 
those nations complete sovereignty), with United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (stating that extraterritoriality can be used by the United States as a legitimate 
means of protecting the country).  See also Meyer, supra note 8, at 123–24 (discussing how 
the extraterritorial regulation or prohibition of conduct affects more than just the nation 
prescribing the regulation or prohibition). 
29 Meyer, supra note 8, at 121–22.  Territorial jurisdiction is a source of authority for 
nations applying legal rules to govern conduct within their borders.  Id. at 123.  Territorial 
jurisdiction is the right of every sovereign nation.  Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).  No nation can regulate conduct of 
another nation without explicit consent.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 131. 
30 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1025 (noting that extraterritoriality can disrupt relations 
with other nations, especially when there is a conflict of laws); see United States v. Mitchell, 
553 F.2d 996, 1003–05 (5th Cir. 1977) (declining to extend the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act of 1972 extraterritorially because doing so would regulate the sovereign territory and 
resource development of other states). 
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it explicitly targets a particular nation, does not necessarily alleviate such 
tensions.31 
Theories that stress the importance of sovereignty insist that 
extraterritorial application of laws encroach upon a nation’s ability to 
govern itself and suggest that increased pressure should instead be 
placed on nations to prosecute crimes domestically.32  However, 
                                                 
31 See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1025, 1027 (discussing how “the risk of jurisdictional 
overreach, clashes with foreign law, and applying U.S. national values and preferences 
inside other countries” implicate sensitive foreign policy matters); see also Robert F. 
Blomquist, The Theoretical Constitutional Shape (and Shaping) of American National Security 
Law, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 439, 448–49 (2011) (explaining how differences in 
constitutional construction, as well as political and cultural differences, make it difficult for 
foreign laws to “fit” with U.S. national security laws).  Even prosecuting matters of extreme 
violence, such as terrorism, may implicate international matters beyond prima facie 
concerns.  Patrick M. Connorton, Note, Tracking Terrorist Financing Through Swift:  When 
U.S. Subpoenas and Foreign Privacy Law Collide, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 283, 283–85 (2007) 
(discussing how U.S. interests and initiatives, especially regarding the war on terror, often 
conflict with those of nations that highly value privacy, such as many European nations).  
For example, after the September 11th attacks, the United States sought to track terrorist 
finances by obtaining financial information collected by the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”).  Id. at 283–84.  However, by granting 
the United States access to such information, SWIFT violated Belgian and European Union 
privacy laws.  Id. at 284.  These nations reprimanded SWIFT, declared their behavior a 
violation of “fundamental European principles,” and attempted to thwart their continued 
compliance with the United States. Id. at 284 & n.11 (citing Press Release, European Union 
Article 29 Working Party, Press Release on the SWIFT Case (Nov. 23, 2006)).  The United 
States’s attempts to pursue its self-interests regularly results in conflicts with other foreign 
laws, and in describing the United States’s use of extraterritoriality, specifically within the 
realm of antitrust laws, David J. Gerber notes: 
 Outside the United States, the extraterritoriality issue has been 
seen largely in a defensive context—namely, how to respond to 
excessive jurisdictional claims by the United States.  These problems 
have reached critical dimensions.  While American courts and 
commentators flail about in search of principles to use in grappling 
with jurisdictional issues, major allies have ceased trying to cooperate 
with the United States to avoid excessive conflicts of jurisdiction and 
have turned to so-called blocking legislation to attempt to protect their 
nationals and enterprises from the reach of United States antitrust 
laws. 
David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 756, 756 (1983) (footnotes omitted).  See also William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft 
Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 363, 363 & n.1 (2001) (stating that 
many nations have enacted blocking legislation in response to the United States’s excessive 
extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws).  It is likely that other nations will apply 
their statutes extraterritorially against the United States and its citizens in retaliation.  
Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 
857 (2009). 
32 See Beth Stephens, Accountability for International Crimes:  The Synergy Between the 
International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 527, 540–44 (2003) 
(discussing state accountability and encouraging states to enforce laws domestically when 
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expanding globalism, communications, and technology will inevitably 
result in multi-jurisdictional conduct, leaving some nations without 
redress unless they apply their laws extraterritorially.33 
In the United States, the extraterritorial capabilities of a federal 
statute are not controlled by constitutional reach; rather, it is a question 
of statutory construction.34  Courts have developed general rules to 
analyze the territorial scope of statutes that are silent on this issue.35  The 
                                                                                                             
there is a violation within their territory, especially when the violation is one of an 
international nature); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that exhaustion of domestic remedies is a prerequisite to using federal laws 
extraterritorially).  Defendants who commit crimes are usually subject to prosecution by 
the country where the crime occurred.  See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 
2000) (explaining that civilians who commit crimes on military installations are usually 
subject to prosecution by the country in which the installation is based).  Some laws 
unilaterally apply extraterritorially to fight conduct committed abroad; however, such a 
practice is generally discouraged.  See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test:  Extraterritoriality’s 
Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1505 (2008) (explaining that resolving international 
problems with domestic law rather than international law may result in other nations 
doing the same, thus threatening U.S. interests).  Absent territorial or national link, 
unilateral application of one nation’s law into another state’s territory via prescriptive 
jurisdiction is a violation of international law.  Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 153 (2006). 
33 See Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (2011) (noting that extraterritoriality 
may be a legitimate means of serving state and non-state interests in “an age of terrorism, 
international business, and globalization”); Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The 
Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli:  Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 1, 8–11, 45 (2007) (discussing how social and technological advancements 
result in an increasingly necessary use of extraterritoriality); Meyer, supra note 8, at 112–13 
(suggesting that extraterritoriality is an appropriate means of battling emerging and 
evolving crimes); see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374–75 (D. Conn. 
2001) (holding that federal laws prohibiting hackers from targeting U.S. computer systems 
applied extraterritorially to non-nationals acting outside of the United States). 
34 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7.  Congress undoubtedly has the ability to enforce its laws 
beyond the borders of the United States.  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991).  To determine whether Congress exercised such authority, courts must look 
at the statutory construction of the laws.  Id. 
35 See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7 (“[A] statute will be construed to have only territorial 
application unless there is a clear indication of some broader intent.”) (footnote omitted).  
Several statutes contain explicit language allowing for extraterritoriality.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 175 (2006) (prescribing “extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction” over developing or 
stockpiling biological weapons); 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2006) (prescribing “extraterritorial 
Federal jurisdiction” over acts of retaliation against witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (2006) 
(explicitly prescribing “extraterritorial jurisdiction” to crimes of assassinating, kidnapping, 
or assaulting the President or presidential staff members); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) 
(prescribing “extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction” over the crime of providing material 
support or resources to terrorist organizations).  Such specific language is not always 
required for a statute to be extraterritorial, and Congress often fashions the extraterritorial 
reach of a statute meticulously.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (explicitly conditioning 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of violence at international airports, such as when the 
offense took place in the United States, the offender or victim was a national, or when the 
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first general rule of statutory construction holds that a statute only 
applies domestically unless a broader intent is clearly indicated.36  The 
second rule states that the nature and purpose of a statute may indicate 
whether Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.37  
Finally, the last general rule holds that a statute may not be interpreted 
as being inconsistent with international law unless contrary intent is 
clearly indicated by Congress.38 
Determining whether a statute is consistent with international law 
requires further analysis.39  To ensure that an interpretation is consistent 
with international law, courts commonly look to customary principles to 
resolve the issue of extraterritoriality.40  The United States generally 
                                                                                                             
offender is found within the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006) (explicitly prescribing 
“extraterritorial jurisdiction” to crimes of assassinating, kidnapping, or assaulting members 
of the Supreme Court or Congress). 
36 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7.  This is essentially a clear statement rule approach to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (“[U]nless a contrary 
intent appears, [federal laws are] meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.”). 
37 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7.  For example, crimes such as smuggling are interpreted to 
imply extraterritorial application, because “smuggling by its very nature involves foreign 
countries.”  Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967).  This rule was first 
clearly announced in United States v. Bowman.  260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922) (“The necessary 
locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by 
the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power 
and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations.”). 
38 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 8.  This principle, referred to as the Charming Betsy canon, states 
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming 
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  Nevertheless, the United States is not constrained 
by international law.  See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008) (holding that 
decisions made by the International Court of Justice are not controlling or “enforceable 
domestic law”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
international law is not controlling when there is an existing U.S. law that is conflicting); 
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that U.S. law is not 
subordinate to international customary law).  However, the United States’s approach 
towards international law gives the impression that it is extremely limiting with regards to 
combating illegal conduct that occurs beyond its borders; however, international law is 
often more flexible and applicable, and the denial of such principles can be seen as a form 
self-restraint.  Colangelo, supra note 26, at 122–23. 
39 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9.  “International law supports rather than dictates decisions in 
the area of the overseas application of American law.”  Id.  Additionally, “[n]either 
Congress nor the courts are bound to the dictates of international law when enacting or 
interpreting statutes” prescribing extraterritorial application.  Id.  See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 
(“If [Congress] chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United 
States, in excess of the limits posed by international law.” (quoting United States v. Pinto-
Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2nd Cir. 1983))). 
40 See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining that Congress looks to international law when 
it evaluates the policy consideration associated with legislation that may have international 
considerations).  In defining customary international law, nations look to customs, usage, 
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utilizes five principles of international law to address public policy 
considerations and national interests when determining whether a 
statute applies extraterritorially.41  The first national interest is referred to 
as the “territorial principle,” which allows domestic laws to apply to 
conduct that occurs within a nation’s geographical boundaries, including 
its territorial waters.42  The second interest is the “nationality principle,” 
which allows for laws to apply extraterritorially to the conduct of its 
citizens while abroad.43  The third interest, the “effects principle,” allows 
                                                                                                             
and treaties of civilized nations.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733–34 (2004)).  Customary 
international law develops through customs and practices among nations and not existing 
norms or judicial decisions.  Id. at 140–41.  “Repeated violations of a rule of customary 
international law by a critical mass of states can modify or eliminate the rule.”  Note, The 
Offences Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2381 (2005) (footnote 
omitted).  Unilateral recognition of new norms of international customary law could 
potentially create friction among nations and is not universally accepted.  Id. at 2381–82.  
Certain principles of international law allow for extraterritorial application of domestic 
laws despite a conflict of laws.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 403(3) (1987) (stating that when there is a conflict of laws, deference is given to the state 
whose interest is greater).  International law stresses that certain international principles 
are legal obligations.  Id. § 102(2).  Customary international law is generally fostered by 
democracies.  Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are 
Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 321 (1999). 
41 See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9 (providing the five principles that the United States uses 
in addressing these issues).  The segmenting of national interests into five specific 
categories was first discussed in a 1935 Harvard Law School study.  Id.  While the five 
principles of international law can be used as interpretative guides to finding 
extraterritoriality, “[t]hey cannot overcome a clear expression of Congressional intent to the 
contrary.”  CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33658, FEDERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:  LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 6 (2006) (footnote omitted).  
The Supreme Court has used the international principles to determine that it is within the 
national interest of the government to protect itself from conduct that may have harmful 
effects on the United States.  Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.  While these principles are generally 
recognized as a means to extend jurisdiction, many cases, including Bowman, utilized these 
principles to interpret the extraterritorial reach of laws.  Id. at 98–100; see Chua Han Mow v. 
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Extraterritorial application of penal laws 
may be justified under any one of the five principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing 
United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976))). 
42 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9–10 (discussing the territorial principle of international law, 
which allows for extraterritorial application of federal laws to crimes that may have an 
effect within the United States); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 
(recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct within or that effects the 
territory of a nation); see also United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421–22 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that molestation of a child within non-territorial waters had detrimental effects 
within the United States and thus fell under the territorial principle of jurisdiction).  The 
territorial principle is flexible and applies to, among other things, acts within geographical 
borders or territorial waters and conduct that has an impact within the territory.  DOYLE, 
supra note 8, at 10. 
43 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9, 11–12; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 402 (recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct committed by or 
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for extraterritorial application of a nation’s laws when conduct occurring 
abroad has an effect within the nation.44  The fourth interest is the 
“protective principle,” which allows for extraterritorial application of 
laws if conduct threatens national security or has adverse consequences 
within a country.45  The final interest is referred to as the “universal 
principle,” which allows for universal jurisdiction over acts that are 
especially heinous and recognized as an international concern.46  
                                                                                                             
against nationals outside of its territory).  But see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(4)(c)(ii), at IV-101 (2012 ed.) (stating that a person 
subject to court-martial cannot be prosecuted for acts committed “in a foreign country 
merely because that act would have been an offense under the United States Code had the 
act occurred in the United States”).  While the nationality principle allows the United States 
to prosecute offenses by nationals committed abroad, it does not alone establish that a 
statute applies extraterritorially.  United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 
730–31 (E.D. Va. 2003).  Some statutes explicitly allow for extraterritoriality under the 
nationality principle.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006) (prescribing extraterritoriality to the 
murder of a U.S. national by another U.S. national outside the United States). 
44 Clopton, supra note 14, at 144 (defining the effects principle as “the notion that a state 
should be able to regulate conduct outside its borders that has effects inside its borders”) 
(footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 
(recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct committed by or against 
nationals outside of its territory).  The effects principle, often referred to as the passive 
personality or objective territorial principle, has regularly been used over the last century 
to govern extraterritorial conduct.  Clopton, supra note 14, at 144. 
45 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9, 11–12; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 402 (recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct outside of its 
territory that threatens security or some national interests).  Under international law, the 
protective principle allows nations to assert jurisdiction over conduct outside of a state 
“that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions.”  
United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33 (1965).  “The protective principle 
does not require that there be proof of an actual or intended effect inside the United 
States.”  United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir. 1985).  The protective 
principle is one that is evolving, and over time courts have expanded the types of cases that 
fall under the protective principle.  See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 
1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that encouraging illegal immigration into the United 
States has an effect on the United States and federal laws prohibiting such conduct apply 
extraterritorially); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
attacks intended to alter foreign policy have an effect on the United States and may be 
prosecuted extraterritorially under the protective principle); United States v. Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the overseas murder or attempted 
murder of federal employees falls under the protective principle); United States v. Ayesh, 
762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 841 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that the conversion of government money 
abroad by a non-national threatens the national interest); United States v. Layton, 509 F. 
Supp. 212, 217–18 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that the protective principle can be used to 
apply statutes criminalizing assaults on U.S. Congressmen extraterritorially). 
46 DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11, 14, 16; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW §§ 404, 423 (1987) (explaining that universal jurisdiction may be had for crimes that 
universally concern the international community, including crimes of slavery, piracy, 
genocide, war crimes, and some acts of terrorism).  The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
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Universal jurisdiction allows any state to prosecute conduct that is 
deemed to be an egregious violation of international norms and 
obligations, such as crimes against humanity and genocide, regardless of 
territorial or national nexus.47  Universal jurisdiction has been praised as 
                                                                                                             
principle of universal jurisdiction early within its history.  See United States v. Furlong, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196–97 (1820) (recognizing universal jurisdiction over piracy).  
Universal jurisdiction most commonly applies to crimes such as piracy, genocide, slavery, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW §§ 404, 423.  However, these categories are not limiting; the flexible nature of 
international law, along with newly emerging global problems, has resulted in the 
expansion of categories of universal violations.  Id. § 404 & cmt. a; see id. at cmt. b (stating 
that universal jurisdiction is not limited to criminal law and may possibly be applicable in 
cases such as tort remedies); Colangelo, supra note 32, at 151 (noting that the expansion of 
categories of universal crimes may soon include sex, drugs, and nuclear arms trafficking).  
For example, it has been recognized that universal jurisdiction may perhaps be applicable 
to “certain acts of terrorism.”  United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
But see Yousef, 327 F.3d at 106–08 & 107 n.42 (refusing to recognize terrorism as a universal 
crime because of a lack of consensus regarding an internationally accepted definition). 
47 Colangelo, supra note 32, at 150–51.  Some nations, including the United States, grant 
themselves universal jurisdiction by prescribing language within legislation directing 
universal applicability.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction 
over the destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction 
over violent acts occurring at international airports); 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2006) (prescribing 
universal jurisdiction over the smuggling of goods into a foreign country from an 
American vessel); 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction over threats, 
theft, or unlawful possession of nuclear material); 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (2006) (prescribing 
universal jurisdiction over actions causing malicious damage to or destruction of any 
building, vehicle, or other personal or real property owned, possessed, or leased by the 
United States by means of fire or explosive); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006) (prescribing universal 
jurisdiction over the unlawful use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
or its nationals); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction over acts of 
terrorism that target, affect, or intend to affect the United States, its officials, and its 
property).  Such statutory construction can be found within the laws of other nations.  See, 
e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 896 (2009) (discussing how Spanish law prescribes universal 
jurisdiction over the crime of torture); Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute:  A 
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 888–89 (2003) (discussing the rise and fall of the Belgian 
law of universal jurisdiction over “human rights atrocities”).  While states have the ability 
to prescribe universal jurisdiction, international law may forbid such application if it is 
determined to be unreasonable.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(1).  In 
determining reasonableness, a number of factors must be considered: 
 (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, 
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or 
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
 (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic 
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally 
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and 
those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
 (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of 
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states 
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a means of bringing warlords and international criminals to justice, but 
its unpredictable use and expansion into new grounds raises questions of 
abuse.48 
Before further exploring the United States’s approach to 
extraterritoriality, it must be understood that other nations’ treatment of 
extraterritoriality varies.49  Germany’s criminal code, for example, 
explicitly states that criminal laws only apply to acts committed within 
                                                                                                             
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of 
such regulation is generally accepted; 
 (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected 
or hurt by the regulation; 
 (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, 
legal, or economic system; 
 (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the 
traditions of the international system; 
 (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity; and 
 (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
Id. § 403(2).  In addition, the Restatement states that when more than one state has an 
interest in exercising jurisdiction, deference is given to the state with the greatest interest.  
Id. § 402(3).  However, universal statutes are considered controversial and are often used to 
manipulate international law or pursue political agendas.  See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 
134 (stating that states may begin to take superfluous legal action against other nations or 
individuals under universal law and that some states might “manipulate the doctrine for 
their own political agendas”); see also Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International 
“False Conflict” of Laws, supra, at 902 (explaining how a particular nation’s definition of a 
universal crime, such as torture, may not mirror the definition of torture recognized under 
international law).  Unilateral prescription of universal jurisdiction can also be problematic 
in that citizens of one nation are often unaware of the laws of another nation.  Id. at 910.  
For this reason, the substance of prescribed universal law should attempt to conform with 
definitions recognized by international law with no enforcement of national entitlement.  
Id. at 889. 
48 Colangelo, supra note 26, at 134; see also id. at 127–28 (prescribing that jurisdiction 
governing conduct in another nation contravenes that nation’s sovereignty).  Such 
uncertainty is in the nature of universal jurisdiction, and the continual expansion of 
universal jurisdiction makes the interpretation of its limits even more problematic.  Meyer, 
supra note 8, 162–63.  A modern example of the abuse of universal jurisdiction is the 
Belgium War Crimes Statute, which granted universal jurisdiction over war crimes.  
Ratner, supra note 47, at 888–89.  It was clear that many of the allegations coming under this 
statute were merely political in nature.  Id. at 890–91.  The law was repealed in 2003 after 
several nations, including the United States, threatened Belgium with sanctions.  Id. at 891. 
49 See John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects and the 
Need for an International Antitrust Response from the World Trade Organization:  A Case Study in 
Broadcast-Media and News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 93 n.208 (2000) 
(discussing how the treatment and degree of extraterritoriality varies depending on the 
nation).  In addition, the consequences for applying one’s laws extraterritorially vary by 
nation as well.  Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:  
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1888 n.72 (1997). 
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German territory, except for certain specifically stated provisions.50  
Generally, European laws apply extraterritorially “so long as there is 
some meaningful connection with the asserting state.”51  However, many 
nations are hesitant to give significant weight to the “effects principle” of 
international law to allow extraterritoriality.52  Nevertheless, many 
nations have recently begun to recognize extraterritoriality and regularly 
use it to obtain jurisdiction over conduct committed abroad.53  With that 
in mind, this Note now discusses the history of the United States’s 
treatment of extraterritoriality.54 
                                                 
50 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], May 15, 1871, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 
3322, as amended, §§ 3, 6–7 (Ger.).  The German Criminal Code provides extraterritoriality 
to acts against internationally protected legal interests, such as human trafficking, drug 
dealing, certain types of pornography, offenses involving nuclear energy, and treaty 
provisions.  Id. § 6.  In addition, German criminal laws may apply extraterritorially if the 
offense was committed by a German and if the act is a criminal offense in the location of its 
commission or if that location is not subject to any criminal jurisdiction.  Id. § 7.  However, 
in 2001, the High Court in Germany allowed extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal acts 
having an effect within Germany.  See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, German High 
Court Decides Novel Issue in Holding that German Law May Impose Criminal Liability on Foreign 
Owners of Internet Websites Who Design Their Sites to Stir Up Racial Hatred Within German 
Society, INT’L L. UPDATE, Jan. 2001, at 6, 7 (discussing how crimes inciting hatred and 
“capable of disturbing the peace in Germany” may be applied extraterritorially and 
holding that extraterritorial criminal liability may be found if the “success necessary to 
constitute a crime” took place in Germany). 
51 Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto Lagodny, Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement over 
Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under 
International Criminal Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–10 (1991) (footnote omitted).  
European nations place a stronger emphasis on the nationality principle of international 
law if the conduct was punishable in the place where it was committed.  Id. at 25.  In 
addition, “European nations generally do not extradite their own nationals” for crimes.  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
52 See id. at 24 (discussing how international recognition of the passive personality 
principle (that is, the effects principle) is in disrepute, especially with regard to 
international terrorism, and that other international principles of law may be necessary for 
jurisdiction, based on this principle, to be recognized).  But see Parrish, supra note 32, at 
1458 & n.13 (explaining how some European nations have begun to use the effects principle 
to obtain extraterritorial jurisdiction, especially with regard to acts with economic effects).  
Nations recognize different definitions of the effects principle.  Ulrich Immenga, Export 
Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints Between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 93, 143 (1995).  Since “customary international law is founded upon the consent of 
nations,” it is questionable as to whether the United States’s traditionally “low standard of 
proof of effects” is in fact “legal under international law.”  Erika Nijenhuis, Comment, 
Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce:  Suggestions for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1003, 1036 (1987). 
53 See Parrish, supra note 31, at 854–56 (stating that other nations have begun to apply 
their domestic laws extraterritorially, especially in regards to cyber-crimes, criminal 
conduct, human rights violations, and anti-competition laws). 
54 See infra Part II.B (discussing the history and development of the treatment of 
extraterritoriality within U.S. courts). 
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B. The History and Development of the Extraterritorial Treatment of Federal 
Laws 
The U.S. courts recognize a presumption against extraterritorial 
application of federal laws.55  This presumption against extraterritoriality 
is not a restriction on “Congress’s power to legislate,” but rather a means 
of interpreting federal laws.56  While federal laws must not be construed 
by courts to conflict with international laws, Congress has the ability to 
prescribe extraterritorial conduct without regard for international law.57  
Despite these common principles, the territorial scope of geoambiguous 
federal laws has been construed inconsistently.58  To better understand 
extraterritoriality, it is necessary to discuss its history and evolution 
within the courts.59  Exceptional focus will be placed on the seminal case 
United States v. Bowman, the subsequent cases interpreting Bowman, and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.60 
                                                 
55 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).  Such a presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies in all cases.  Id.  But see United States v. Al Kassar, 660 
F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not 
apply in cases involving criminal statutes (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 
(1922); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993))).  The presumption can 
be overcome if the context of the statute provides a clear indication of extraterritoriality.  
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.  However, it has not yet been clarified what a “clear indication” 
entails when overcoming the presumption.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 148. 
56 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.  In interpreting whether a statute applies extraterritorially, 
courts may look to the context of the statute.  Id. at 2883.  Although there is a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, Congress has the legislative capacity to construct federal statutes 
to apply extraterritorially.  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  
For example, federal laws concerning terrorism and conduct at international airports often 
contain extraterritorial language.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(e)–(f) (2006) (prescribing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a)(2) (2006) (prescribing extraterritorial jurisdiction to providing material support 
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 3042 (2006) 
(prescribing extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. citizens). 
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987) (stating that federal 
laws and other acts of Congress can supersede international laws or agreements if intended 
for that purpose).  U.S. federal laws are “not subordinate to customary international 
law[s]” and may conflict with it, if so necessary.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 
(2d Cir. 2003); see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
international law is not controlling over U.S. law and cannot be used to limit the 
President’s war powers). 
58 Compare Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–99 (allowing for a loosened application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality), with Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (applying a strict 
presumption against extraterritoriality). 
59 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the early development and evolution of 
extraterritoriality in U.S. law). 
60 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how courts’ treatment of extraterritoriality has 
developed into its modern state). 
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1. Early History of Extraterritoriality Leading to United States v. 
Bowman 
One of the original sources of extraterritoriality is found within the 
Constitution itself, which authorizes Congress “[t]o define and 
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”61  The Constitution also 
expressly permits universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy.62  However, 
the Supreme Court was quick to place limitations upon statutory 
interpretation, and in 1804 stated,  “[A]n act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”63  This doctrine, which became known as the 
Charming Betsy canon, states that federal statutes must not be interpreted 
in a way that violates international laws unless there is no other possible 
way of construing them.64 
The presumption against extraterritoriality appears early in the 
United States’s history as a means to avoid international conflicts.65  In 
                                                 
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  Congress shall have the power to “define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations.”  Id.  This clause, known as the Offences Clause, allows the United States to 
prescribe laws regulating conduct that is considered to be a violation of all nations.  
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 137.  Today, the “law of nations” is analogous with 
international customary law.  The Offences Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 
40, at 2381.  The constitutional drafters did not take a fixed view of international law and 
designed the clause to allow for flexibility to allow proper management as international 
law evolves.  Id.  By constructing the Constitution in this manner, the United States drew its 
authority to legislate from several nations.  Id. 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196–
97 (1820) (recognizing that Congress has universal jurisdiction over piracy). 
63 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); 
see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) 
(explaining that the National Labor Relations Act is directly at odds with the Honduran 
Labor Code and unreasonably interferes with a nation’s sovereign authority, and thus is 
inapplicable). 
64 Meyer, supra note 8, at 143.  Under the Charming Betsy canon, geoambiguous laws 
must be interpreted to conform to customary international law in order to avoid 
interference with other nations.  Id.  The reason for this doctrine, arguably, is that the 
United States’s foreign affairs power comes from international law, and, thus, the United 
States is obligated to obey international law.  Colangelo, supra note 26, at 156.  However, 
despite this doctrine, the United States is not subordinate to customary international law or 
treaties.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003). 
65 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708, 714 (1900) (finding that U.S. courts 
govern with respect to the law of nations and are thus obliged to recognize and give effect 
to international law); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no 
nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own 
citizens. . . . [T]he phrases used in our municipal laws . . . must always be restricted in 
construction, to places and persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and 
jurisdiction.”); see also Knox, supra note 13, at 371 (stating that the Charming Betsy canon is 
construed as an older, weaker presumption against extraterritoriality).  The earliest cases 
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1909, the Supreme Court reiterated this stance in American Banana v. 
United Fruit Co.66  In American Banana, the Supreme Court found that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply extraterritorially and held that all 
statutes are “prima facie territorial” and that, as a general rule, “the 
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by 
the law of the country where the act is done.”67  However, as 
communication and transportation began to improve and offenses began 
to “exhibit an inter-jurisdictional flavor,” the Court began to question the 
strict application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.68  These 
factors, along with increasing threats to national security, culminated in 
the Supreme Court case United States v. Bowman.69 
In Bowman, the Court found that a criminal statute prohibiting fraud 
against the United States applied extraterritorially.70  The Court 
recognized that criminal statutes can be interpreted to apply in such a 
way if they are “not logically dependent on their locality for the 
government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the 
government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever 
perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens.”71  In addition, 
the Court in Bowman declared that crimes against individuals, their 
                                                                                                             
involving extraterritoriality “often involved offenses committed aboard American ships or 
by or against Americans.”  Brian L. Porto, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts, 1 A.L.R. FED. 2D 415 (2005). 
66 213 U.S. 347, 356–59 (1909). 
67 Id. at 356–57 (citations and quotations omitted).  In American Banana, the American 
Banana Company, located in what is now Panama, was acquired by an Alabama 
corporation.  Id. at 354.  After purchasing the company, United Fruit Company intended to 
control and monopolize the banana trade in parts of Central and South America.  Id.  With 
this intent in mind, United Fruit Company convinced government and military officials to 
prevent American Banana from doing business in the area.  Id. at 354–55. 
68 Colangelo, supra note 26, at 128. 
69 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
70 Id. at 98–100.  In Bowman, three Americans were charged with conspiring to defraud 
the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, a company of which the United 
States was the sole stockholder.  Id. at 95–96.  The conspiracy was concocted in Brazil, and 
the context of the federal statute being used against them was silent on its territorial scope.  
Id. at 96–97. 
71 Id. at 98.  Bowman explicitly allowed some criminal laws to apply extraterritorially to 
U.S. citizens; however, the Court declined to rule whether extraterritorial application 
applied to non-citizens acting abroad.  See id. at 102–03 (declining to predict whether the 
statute could apply extraterritorially to a non-national).  Several years following the 
Bowman decision, federal courts began to allow laws to apply extraterritorially to foreign 
nationals as well.  See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that theft of personal property of the United States applied extraterritorially to 
foreign nationals); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding that extraterritorial laws can be applied to the conduct of foreign nationals); 
United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D. Mass. 1985) (applying the Espionage Act 
extraterritorially to a foreign national). 
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property, and the community cannot be applied extraterritorially 
without prescription.72  Here, the Court found that the security of the 
U.S. government took precedent over the security of its individual 
citizens.73 
Bowman is a pivotal point in guiding America’s handling of 
extraterritoriality and international law.74  However, Bowman still left 
many questions—for example, it was undetermined if criminal statutes 
could be applied extraterritorially to non-citizens.75  As a result, courts 
began to interpret the territorial scope of federal statutes inconsistently, 
providing no clear guidance to lower courts or litigants.76 
                                                 
72 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.  Circuit courts have expanded on this ruling, and many allow 
some crimes against individuals and the community to apply extraterritorially.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a statute 
criminalizing sexual misconduct against minors applied extraterritorially); United States v. 
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that violent crimes against 
Americans in furtherance of a racketeering operation applied extraterritorially); United 
States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that a federal manslaughter statute 
can be applied extraterritorially). 
73 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (recognizing the government’s right to defend itself from 
extraterritorial conduct, but explicitly declining such right to individuals).  Bowman can be 
construed to say that there is no presumption against extraterritoriality for violations of 
federal criminal law that are “not logically dependent on their locality.”  Id.; see Curtis A. 
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 333 (2001) (construing 
Bowman to mean that there is no presumption against extraterritoriality when crimes focus 
on an extraterritorial matter). 
74 See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 33, at 45 (discussing how Bowman was a turning 
point in modern legal history by recognizing that social and technological advancements 
and changes called for an increasing necessity for extraterritorial use of laws). 
75 One of the biggest questions left unanswered, which was explicitly left unaddressed 
in Bowman, was whether laws can be interpreted to apply extraterritorially to non-citizens 
of the United States.  See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102–03 (questioning the applicability of 
jurisdiction over the unapprehended defendant, who was a citizen of Great Britain).  
Bowman confirmed that the nationality, protective, and effects principles may be used to 
apply domestic laws extraterritorially.  See id. at 100–02 (allowing extraterritorial 
application of federal laws to conduct committed by nationals that had effects within the 
territory of the United States and induced the government to protect itself).  Soon after 
Bowman, the Supreme Court confirmed that the nationality principle can apply 
extraterritorially to govern conduct committed by its citizens abroad.  See United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that the Constitution and 
federal laws have no force in foreign nations unless applied to U.S. nationals).  However, 
lower courts have determined that extraterritorial jurisdiction may also apply to non-
citizens acting abroad as well.  See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that, under Bowman, citizenship is irrelevant, and laws can be 
applied extraterritorially to both citizens and non-citizens); United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. 
Supp. 2d 832, 840 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that federal laws may apply extraterritorially to 
non-citizens); see also supra note 71 (exploring cases in which federal laws were applied 
extraterritorially to non-citizens). 
76 Knox, supra note 12, at 643.  The guidelines handed down by courts to overcome the 
presumption have varied widely, “ranging from statements that a clear expression of 
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2. Extraterritoriality post-Bowman and Morrison 
Following the ruling in Bowman, lower courts began to gradually 
give extraterritorial effect to some federal laws, including civil statutes.77  
However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in 1949 with Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.78  Over forty 
years later, the Supreme Court again revived the presumption in EEOC 
v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), which promoted a “clear statement” 
rule requiring express language within a statute indicating 
extraterritoriality.79  Nevertheless, courts continued to apply laws 
exterritorially during this time, and circuit courts seemed to develop 
their own means of evaluating the territorial scope of statutes.80  The 
                                                                                                             
congressional intent is necessary, to indications that the structure, legislative history, and 
agency interpretations of the statute are relevant, to decisions that some circumstances 
justify extending law extraterritorially without any direct evidence of legislative intent at 
all.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
77 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795–96 (1993) (finding that 
civil provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when foreign conduct produces 
a substantial effect in the United States); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 
416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98) (determining that the Sherman Act 
applies extraterritorially); see also Clopton, supra note 14, at 167 (discussing how Bowman is 
“routinely reconstruct[ed]” to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality and 
apply criminal laws extraterritorially).  However, after Bowman, a general presumption 
against extraterritoriality still continued to exist.  See infra note 78 (discussing Foley Brothers, 
Inc. v. Filardo). 
78 See 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (“The canon of construction which teaches that legislation 
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional 
intent may be ascertained . . . .” (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))).  
In Foley Brothers, the Supreme Court determined that the Eight Hour Law did not apply 
extraterritorially to a U.S. citizen employed abroad.  Id. at 289–90. 
79 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).  In Aramco, the 
Supreme Court found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not regulate 
employment practices of U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens abroad.  Id. at 248–49.  
Aramco further enhanced the presumption against extraterritoriality by requiring express 
language (or a “clear statement”) to overcome the presumption.  See id. at 248 (requiring an 
“affirmative intention” of Congress to be “clearly expressed” for the presumption to be 
defeated).  The dissent in Aramco argued that a clear statement rule was too stringent and 
believed that congressional intent could be ascertained to overcome the presumption.  Id. at 
261 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
80 Knox, supra note 13, at 393.  While the Bowman case discussed territorial effects, its 
legitimate reasoning utilized the protective principle.  Id.  Generally, this is the Second 
Circuit’s approach to extraterritoriality.  Id.  However, the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits appear to utilize an effects test in evaluating extraterritoriality.  Id.  The Eleventh 
Circuit has gone so far as to state that, after Bowman, many circuits “inferred congressional 
intent to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic 
harm.”  United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  The D.C. and Ninth Circuit have an even broader evaluation of 
extraterritoriality.  Knox, supra note 13, at 393.  Under these two circuits, there is no 
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development of technology and foreign relations eventually led to more 
complicated issues regarding extraterritoriality.81 
The war on terrorism has also had a particularly profound effect on 
the presumption.82  After September 11, 2001, courts began interpreting 
several statutes to apply extraterritorially in an effort to fight terrorists 
conducting operations abroad.83  It appeared that the standard had 
perhaps been lowered; however, the Supreme Court soon reinvigorated 
the approach of a firm presumption against extraterritoriality.84 
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.—a securities case in which Australian investors sued a bank in 
Australia for fraudulently reporting the numbers and documents of a 
                                                                                                             
presumption against extraterritoriality when the concern of the statute is not limited to 
domestic affairs.  Id.; see Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1345 (finding that federal law 
prohibiting encouragement of illegal immigration into the United States applied 
extraterritorially because it was “fundamentally international, not simply domestic, in 
focus and effect”). 
81 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing how recent social and 
technological advancements, the increase in international business, and terrorism may call 
for an increased need in extraterritoriality). 
82 Adler, supra note 17, at 183.  For example, historically, the United States had no reason 
to apply its immigration laws extraterritorially.  Id.  However, after September 11, there 
was a sudden interest in preserving our borders so as to prevent the entry of would-be 
terrorists.  Id.  Suddenly, there was an interest in applying immigration laws 
extraterritorially.  Id.; see Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1347–48 (holding that encouraging 
illegal immigration into the United States has an effect on the United States and federal 
laws prohibiting such conduct apply extraterritorially). 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that federal 
laws can apply extraterritorially to non-citizens conspiring to commit some terrorist acts); 
United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. N.M. 2008) (holding that federal 
law applied extraterritorially to a Canadian citizen for a terrorism plot to blow up the 
Alaskan Pipeline); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(suggesting that there might be universal jurisdiction over some acts of terrorism).  Cases 
applying extraterritoriality to acts of terrorism still attempt to appease international law, 
especially with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction and due process.  See Reumayr, 530 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1221–22 (stating that international law allows for extraterritorial application of 
federal terrorism laws under the protective principle); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 196 
(finding that the protective principle established in Bowman is consistent with international 
law); see also DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing how the protective principle is often 
used to combat terrorism); Knox, supra note 13, at 357 (discussing international principles 
that could be used to fight terrorism abroad).  This is odd considering some of these cases 
deny the controlling authority of international law.  See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91 (holding that 
the United States is not subordinate to international law); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 214 
(finding that Congress has the power to override international law (citing Cook v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119–20 (1933))).   
84 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1043 (“On the other hand, the Court’s recent reinvigoration 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison appears strongly to support a 
separation of powers model that preferences foreign territorial sovereignty as a default 
rule.”). 
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Florida-based mortgage company owned by the bank.85  In Morrison, the 
Court explicitly stated that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of 
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”86  The Court confirmed that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies in all cases, and a 
possible extraterritorial interpretation of a statute does not override the 
presumption against such application.87  Furthermore, the Court stated 
that a statute only has extraterritorial effect if Congress clearly expresses 
such an intention within the context of the statute.88  But, after finding 
that the law in question did not apply extraterritorially, the Court 
assessed whether the domestic conduct within the case was sufficient to 
establish a domestic connection.89  The Court stressed the focus of 
                                                 
85 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875–76 (2010).  Before Morrison, 
circuits varied in their method of assessment of extraterritorial application of securities 
laws, and the two most common means utilized by lower courts to establish 
extraterritoriality were the “effects test” and the “conduct test.”  Id. at 2879.  The effects test 
was used to determine whether the conduct had a “substantial effect” on the United States 
or its citizens.  Id.; see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated 
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887–88 (finding that securities laws can apply extraterritorially 
when conduct affects American securities).  The conduct test sought to determine where 
the illegal conduct actually took place.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879.  See SEC v. Kasser, 548 
F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (holding that securities 
laws may only apply extraterritorially when at least a part of the conduct “designed to 
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country”).  Both of these tests, in some way, 
attempted to conform to the territorial principle of international law.  See Colangelo, supra 
note 9, at 1080 (explaining that the effects test demonstrated the objective territorial 
principle of international law, and the conduct test demonstrated the subjective territorial 
principle of international law). 
86 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.  Before Morrison, federal courts had been applying 
extraterritoriality to securities laws for over forty years.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080; see 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (noting that courts had been giving extraterritorial effect to 
securities and exchange acts for decades). 
87 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (finding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
had become unpredictable and holding, “Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply 
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can 
legislate with predictable effects”) (footnote omitted). 
88 Id. at 2883.  In renewing the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court stated 
that a statute’s context may be consulted in determining whether it can apply 
extraterritorially.  Id.  While there must be a clear indication of extraterritoriality, a statute 
is not required to say “this law applies abroad” to have extraterritorial effect.  Id.  This 
ruling bolstered a strong presumption against extraterritoriality, but it did not require, as 
the Court did in Aramco, express language or a “clear statement rule” to overcome 
extraterritoriality.  Compare id. (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
not a “clear statement rule”), with EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 
(1991) (requiring the existence of a clear statement rule to overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality).  In regards to the statute in question in Morrison, the Court 
stated that it gave “no clear indication” of an extraterritorial application.  Morrison, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2883. 
89 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–84.  The petitioners in Morrison attempted to avoid the 
issue of extraterritoriality altogether by asserting that the conduct committed within the 
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congressional concern when evaluating statutes and found that the 
existence of some domestic activity was not enough to overcome the 
presumption.90 
Morrison does not explicitly overrule Bowman; however, it definitely 
questions its applicability.91  While Bowman permits a broader 
interpretation of statutes that allow for an assumption of Congress’s 
intent, Morrison requires Congress’s affirmative intent to be clearly 
expressed.92  The Court in Morrison found that the context of a statute 
may be helpful in determining its extraterritorial reach, but it promoted a 
                                                                                                             
United States was sufficient for a domestic claim, but the Court disagreed.  See id. at 2885–
88 (discussing the lack of substantial conduct within the United States to establish a 
domestic claim).  The Court criticized overemphasis on domestic activity (and, 
consequentially, the effects and conduct tests, as well as the territorial principle of 
international law) in determining whether laws can apply extraterritorially.  Id. at 2884.  
Instead, the Court took a “purely domestic” approach in Morrison.  Lea Brilmayer, The New 
Extraterritoriality:  Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the 
Presumption Against the Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 685 
(2011) (explaining that treating some cases as purely domestic, even when they have 
connections to more than one state, ensures that the transactions will be regulated).  After 
Morrison, Congress amended some provisions of the U.S. Securities Act to explicitly grant 
extraterritorial application.  See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
90 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.  In order for a federal statute to apply extraterritorially, 
Congress must clearly express such an affirmative intent.  Id. at 2877.  In Morrison, the 
“focus” of the statute in question was not on the location of the offense but on the precise 
conduct being addressed.  Id. at 2884.  However, the mere existence of some domestic 
activity does not overcome the presumption.  See id. (“But the presumption against 
extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel 
whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”). 
91 See United States v. Finch, Cr. No. 10-00333 SOM-KSC, 2010 WL 3938176, at *4 (D. 
Haw. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that, despite defendant’s argument, Morrison neither 
implicitly nor explicitly overrules Bowman).  The argument has been made that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison overrules Bowman; however, thus far courts have 
disagreed.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303–04 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(stating that Morrison neither limits nor overrules Bowman); Finch, 2010 WL 3938176, at *3–5 
(recognizing that anti-bribery statutes were similar to the types of statutes Bowman allowed 
to apply extraterritorially and dismissing the defendant’s argument that Morrison 
overruled Bowman); see also United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 798–99 (7th Cir. 
2010) (dismissing defendant’s argument that the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
civil cases did not overrule Bowman, which explicitly allowed extraterritorial application of 
some criminal statutes).  It is possible that both Morrison and Bowman can co-exist.  See 
Clopton, supra note 14, at 194 (noting that Bowman “can be maintained consistently with the 
Court’s decision in Morrison”). 
92 Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (finding that some activity or effect is not 
sufficient to establish extraterritorial application, and in order for a statute to apply 
extraterritorially, a clear indication of extraterritoriality must be expressed), with United 
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922) (holding that extraterritoriality can “be inferred 
from the nature of the offense”). 
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form of the “clear statement” rule by which extraterritoriality cannot 
apply unless such statutory language is explicitly found.93 
C. The Current State of Extraterritoriality 
The current state of extraterritoriality is difficult to thoroughly 
define, but it can be stated with certainty that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is more easily overcome within the context of criminal 
offenses.94  Cases immediately following Morrison indicate that lower 
courts generally favor Bowman over Morrison, particularly in criminal 
cases.95  The presumption is even lower when criminal conduct 
                                                 
93 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2891–92 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how the 
majority’s insistence on a “clear indication” from Congress to apply a statute 
extraterritorially appears to re-establish the “clear statement” rule laid out by the Court in 
Aramco). 
94 See Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Bowman 
to not apply to all cases and stating that, under Bowman, “only criminal statutes, and 
perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed 
against it, are exempt from the presumption”).  Bowman specifically refers to the 
extraterritorial application of criminal statutes, explicitly stating that crimes against 
individuals and their property, including “assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, 
arson, embezzlement, and frauds of all kinds,” do not apply extraterritorially without 
statutory prescription.  Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98; see Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 798–99 (stating 
that Bowman explicitly treats criminal statutes differently from civil statutes).  Some courts 
have expanded Bowman to allow for some crimes against individuals, specifically children, 
to apply extraterritorially.  See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that, under Bowman, federal statutes prohibiting sexual exploitation of minors 
apply extraterritorially); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(determining that child pornography statutes applied extraterritorially (citing Bowman, 260 
U.S. at 98)).  In Bowman, the Court determined that there is no presumption against 
extraterritoriality for criminal acts not logically dependent on their locality for the 
government’s jurisdiction, “but are enacted because of the right of the government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.”  Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
95 The language of Morrison is sweeping.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (“When a 
statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.”).  However, 
since the Court decided Morrison, lower courts have ignored the decision with regard to 
criminal statutes and rely more heavily on Bowman.  Compare NewMarket Corp. v. 
Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503 HEH, 2011 WL 1988073, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2011) 
(holding that civil federal price discrimination laws have no extraterritorial application 
under Morrison), with United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811, 813–14 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that a criminal law prohibiting conspiracy to commit torture applies 
extraterritorially), Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 304–05 (finding that criminal bribery statutes 
may apply extraterritorially when the United States is a victim), United States v. Ayesh, 762 
F. Supp. 2d 832, 840 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that bribery statutes can be applied 
extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim), United States v. Hasan, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 642, 686 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that use of a firearm to commit a violent crime 
against a member of the uniformed services applies extraterritorially without discussion of 
Morrison), and Finch, 2010 WL 3938176, at *3–4 (finding that criminal bribery and money 
laundering statutes apply extraterritorially and holding that Morrison does not overrule 
Bowman).  But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–747 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that 
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somehow affects the United States.96  For example, the United States 
often applies federal laws extraterritorially when an individual attempts 
to defraud or terrorize the U.S. government.97 
Because Morrison is still young in its jurisprudence, its ultimate effect 
on Bowman is unclear.98  It is acceptable to believe that the broad 
                                                                                                             
Morrison does not prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially, especially 
when the basis of the claim includes criminal violations of international law); United States 
v. Jack, No. 2:07-cr-00266 FCD DAD, 2010 WL 4718613, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) 
(holding that criminal law regarding transferring or possessing a machine gun does not 
apply extraterritorially without discussion of Morrison). 
96 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (holding that there is no presumption against 
extraterritoriality for “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on 
their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the 
government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated”).  Courts 
often cite the protective principle under international law to justify extraterritorial 
application of federal laws when it is a party to a case.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1078; see 
United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998) (“On authority of 
Bowman, courts have routinely inferred congressional intent to provide for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic harm.”) (citations omitted). 
97 See, e.g., Bowman, 260 U.S. at 99–100 (holding that the United States may apply its laws 
extraterritorially to protect itself from fraud); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (explaining that federal laws can apply extraterritorially to terrorist acts aboard 
civilian aircraft); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that 
certain federal laws addressing terrorism may apply extraterritorially); Campbell, 798 F. 
Supp. 2d at 306 (determining that bribery statutes can apply extraterritorially when the 
United States is a victim); Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (providing that bribery statutes can 
be applied extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim); United States v. Bin 
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 201–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that statutes pertaining to 
murders committed during the course of an attack on a U.S. facility apply 
extraterritorially). 
98 Some lower courts have read the ruling of Morrison literally, and the Second Circuit, 
as well as some district courts, has relied on Morrison to deny civil extraterritorial 
application to the RICO Act.  See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 
32–33 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that, in light of Morrison, the RICO Act cannot be applied 
extraterritorially, even with the inclusion of broad, general language); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. 
Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–51 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that the RICO Act does not apply 
extraterritorially and finding that Morrison abrogates the Eleventh Circuit’s traditional 
approach that RICO does have extraterritorial reach); United States v. Philip Morris USA, 
Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that there is a presumption against 
applying the civil provisions of the RICO Act extraterritoriality).  The fact that the RICO 
Act has both criminal and civil provisions further complicates matters, and it is unclear if 
Morrison would be interpreted as applying to criminal RICO provisions as well.  See 
Clopton, supra note 14, at 188–89 & n.206 (noting that some statutes, such as the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and RICO, contain both civil and criminal provisions and that “[a]ny 
preference for flexibility in criminal cases would have to be weighed against the desire to 
give a consistent meaning to the same statutory text”) (footnote omitted).  Some cases have 
continued to loosely apply extraterritoriality and look to Bowman rather than to Morrison.  
See, e.g., Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d at 744–47 (finding that Morrison does not prevent the Alien Tort 
Statute from applying extraterritorially, especially when the basis of the claim includes 
violations of international law); United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–67 (2d Cir. 
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language in Morrison will begin to affect criminal law.99  Thus far, it is too 
soon to determine Morrison’s long-term effect on the presumption, 
especially in regards to criminal statutes.100  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has demonstrated a continued trend of establishing a strict 
presumption against extraterritoriality.101 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A clear indication of extraterritoriality is required to overcome the 
presumption, but there are no specific guidelines defining what “a clear 
indication” entails.102  Courts, in practice, sometimes apply laws 
                                                                                                             
2011) (recognizing Morrison but relying on Bowman to determine that laws prohibiting the 
transportation of minors for sexual purposes applies extraterritorially); Belfast, 611 F.3d at 
811, 813–14 (mentioning Morrison but relying on Bowman in determining that laws 
prohibiting conspiracy to commit torture apply extraterritorially); Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 
at 300–04 (recognizing Morrison but relying on Bowman in determining that bribery statutes 
can be applied extraterritorially when the United States is a victim); Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 
at 840–41 (relying on Bowman, without mentioning Morrison, in determining that bribery 
statutes can be applied extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim). 
99 See Clopton, supra note 14, at 181 (“A court looking at an ambiguous criminal statute 
may treat Morrison as the straw that broke Bowman’s back, requiring a stringent 
presumption [against extraterritoriality] in criminal as well as civil cases.”). 
100 See supra note 91 (discussing criminal cases exploring the early relationship between 
Morrison and Bowman).  The Court in Morrison determined that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied “in all cases.”  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.  However, it is 
possible that Bowman simply remains to be an “exception” to the presumption.  Meyer, 
supra note 8, at 135.  Additionally, many courts have expressed the belief “that Bowman and 
the civil law precedents live in harmony.”  Clopton, supra note 14, at 166 (footnote omitted).  
For example, in United States v. Leija-Sanchez, which was decided just months prior to 
Morrison, the Seventh Circuit held that civil decisions “cannot implicitly overrule a decision 
holding that criminal statutes are applied differently.”  602 F.3d 797, 798 (7th Cir. 2010). 
101 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877, 2881 (discussing the “longstanding principle” of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and holding that the presumption applies “in all 
cases”); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (promoting a 
strong presumption against extraterritoriality); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949) (endorsing a presumption against extraterritoriality); Am. Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“All legislation is prima facie territorial.” (quoting Ex 
parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499 (1859); People v. Merrill, 
2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596)).  But see William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. 
REV. 687, 688 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of 
extraterritoriality).  Despite these cases, many lower courts have continued to interpret 
geoambiguous statutes to apply extraterritorially.  See supra notes 91, 95 (listing cases citing 
Bowman to find extraterritoriality after the Morrison decision). 
102 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”); Meyer, supra note 8, at 148 (“[I]t is far from clear 
what must exist for the presumption against extraterritoriality to be overcome.”); see also 
Clopton, supra note 14, at 167 (“[C]ourts routinely reconstruct Bowman to overcome the 
presumption and apply a U.S. criminal law abroad.”) (footnote omitted). 
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extraterritorially without any clearly stated indication.103  It is not 
uncommon for courts to rely on principles of international law to justify 
the extraterritorial application of domestic law.104  However, these 
principles can easily be manipulated to liberally interpret the territorial 
scope of statutes.105  While extraterritorial interpretation may abuse the 
intended confines of a statute, strictly applying the presumption can 
have a severely limiting effect and may result in excessive restraint.106 
U.S. courts often juxtapose the presumption with international 
principles, particularly the effects and protective principles, when 
evaluating extraterritoriality, and a court’s use of one of these principles 
over another appears to involve an intricate “balancing” test.107  In Part 
                                                 
103 Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49 & n.180 (providing examples of cases where the court 
ruled that the laws applied extraterritorially); see, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (recognizing the extraterritorial effect of the Sherman Act despite 
its silence on geographical reach); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 
2011) (finding that a federal law criminalizing conspiracy to kill U.S. officers applies 
extraterritorially, despite the fact that the statute “contains no explicit extraterritoriality 
provision”); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(iv), which criminalizes encouragement of illegal entry into 
the United States, applies extraterritorially despite its silence on specific geographical 
applicability). 
104 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 143–45 (discussing the use of international law to justify 
applying laws extraterritorially); see also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that the principles of international law may also be used to establish a 
nexus and fulfill due process requirements). 
105 See Knox, supra note 12, at 650 (discussing how international law can provide a 
jurisdictional basis to apply statutes extraterritorially without evidence indicating such 
intent by Congress).  The international principles of law lack a guiding criterion with 
regard to their application.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 150.  They are inherently difficult to 
ascertain and can easily be manipulated.  Id. at 150–51.  Determining extraterritoriality 
based exclusively on these principles could very well allow the United States to apply 
almost any federal law globally.  Id.  In addition, applying the principles of international 
law does not avoid the fact that they may conflict with the laws of other foreign nations.  
Knox, supra note 13, at 384–85. 
106 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150 (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
may be overly broad and may restrict application of domestic law, even when there is no 
conflict with international law); see also United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 
2006) (finding that the PROTECT Act would be “severely” limited if it was prohibited from 
applying extraterritorially).  A strong presumption against extraterritoriality may actually 
result in discord with foreign nations if it prevents the United States from fulfilling 
international obligations.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1023–24. 
107 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 146 (discussing how the principles of international law 
allow courts to balance interests and circumvent “traditional territorial” restrictions of 
laws).  Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law suggests the use of a 
balancing test in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2) (1987).  But section 403 has gone 
beyond jurisdiction and has been used to determine the appropriateness of applying 
statutes extraterritorially as well.  See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839–41 
(9th Cir. 1994) (discussing section 403’s role in determining that the extraterritorial 
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III.A, this Note examines problems associated with a strict presumption 
against an extraterritoriality approach by courts.108  It focuses 
particularly on the analysis found within the Morrison case.109  
Additionally, this Note examines why the current state of affairs renders 
this approach archaic if applied absolutely.110  Next, Part III.B evaluates 
Bowman and discusses the dangers of conservatively applying the 
presumption.111  It also analyzes the intermingling of international 
principles with federal laws and techniques that courts use to obtain 
extraterritoriality.112 
A. The Impracticality of a Strict Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Although a strong presumption against extraterritoriality prevents 
U.S. laws from conflicting or interfering with foreign law, it may also 
impede the United States from exercising its sovereign power to protect 
itself and its citizens.113  While the presumption has been a cornerstone of 
U.S. law and policy, the emphasis of the presumption has fluctuated 
between a focus on the content and context of laws to an evaluation 
emphasizing the interests of the United States.114  In Morrison, the Court 
avoided supplemental considerations that stretch the extraterritorial 
                                                                                                             
application of a statute punishing violent crimes committed in aid of a racketeering 
enterprise to violent crimes associated with drug trafficking is reasonable under 
international law principles).  While section 403’s balancing test is useful in guiding 
extraterritoriality, in practice, “balancing interests” would likely be biased in favor of 
application and may result in foreign affair gaffes.  Knox, supra note 13, at 380; see also 
Meyer, supra note 8, at 160 (discussing the dangers of using section 403 to determine 
extraterritorial application). 
108 See infra Part III.A (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court’s 
reasoning in Morrison, and the consequences of the presumption). 
109 See infra notes 128–45 and accompanying text (analyzing Morrison). 
110 See infra notes 139–45 and accompanying text (explaining how a strict application of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality fails to adequately promote the modern legal 
interests of the United States). 
111 See infra Part III.B (analyzing Bowman and explaining how over-applying federal laws 
extraterritorially violates sovereignty and promotes judicial activism). 
112 See infra notes 161–84 and accompanying text (analyzing the courts’ use of 
international principles and vague statutory construction to achieve extraterritoriality). 
113 See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1037 (discussing how the purpose of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is to prevent discord with foreign laws); see also United States v. 
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922) (discussing how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may prevent the United States from adequately defending itself in some 
cases).  Although one of the main functions of the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
to avoid conflicts with foreign laws, it applies even when no conflict exists.  Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010). 
114 Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (stressing the focus of a statute when analyzing its 
geographic reach), with Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–99 (discussing the overriding interest of 
protecting the government when evaluating extraterritoriality). 
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capabilities of statutes and instead reemphasized the focus of the statute 
itself.115  While strictly applying the presumption fosters uniformity and 
prevents over-applying laws to reach extraterritorial conduct, it is also 
an inefficient means of handling contemporary legal issues.116  For 
example, applying the presumption to a territorially silent federal law 
that simply criminalizes conspiracies to kill U.S. employees complies 
with the United States’s methodology, sets precedent, and respects 
international boundaries; however, the government sometimes requires 
its employees to travel internationally, and applying the presumption in 
these cases hinders the effectiveness of the law.117 
Such a hindrance demonstrates the restrictive nature of a strict 
interpretation of the presumption against extraterritoriality.118  The 
presumption restrains the United States from effectively battling new, 
illegal conduct absent explicit statutory provisions.119  In a sense, when a 
domestic law does not explicitly prescribe extraterritoriality, the United 
                                                 
115 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.  The Court noted that such an approach also encourages 
Congress to legislate and construct laws more precisely.  Id. at 2881.  The previous 
approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality appeared to be more dynamic—
especially with regard to achieving national interests.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 147–48. 
116 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (noting how the presumption approach may not 
adequately handle new-age crimes). 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a law 
prohibiting conspiracy to kill U.S. officers or employees applies extraterritorially despite 
the absence of an explicit extraterritorial provision, because “a significant number of those 
employees perform their duties outside U.S. territory”); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 
1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying a law prohibiting the attempted murder of DEA 
agents extraterritorially, because it “is exactly the type of crime that Congress must have 
intended to apply extraterritorially”). 
118 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150 (explaining that one of the shortcomings of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is its restrictiveness).  While sometimes the courts 
find that the presumption can be overcome if an extraterritorial act produces effects within 
the United States, this is not a hard-line rule.  See Knox, supra note 13, at 351.  However, the 
fact that an act committed abroad produces effects within the United States does not 
necessarily mean that a law must be construed to apply extraterritorially to reach such 
conduct.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–84 (evaluating the effects of a security fraud 
committed abroad and localizing the effects instead of relying on extraterritoriality).  In 
Morrison, the Court did not even attempt to address or reconcile previous judicial decisions 
that did not take a strict approach against extraterritoriality.  Knox, supra note 12, at 647. 
119 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (discussing how the presumption can be an 
ineffective approach to handling “new-age scenarios”).  In Morrison, the Court noted that, 
in making a determination on extraterritoriality, “context [of the statute] can be consulted 
as well” as the text itself.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.  However, the definition of “context” 
is unclear, thus leaving lower courts with a confusing standard.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 
1043.  Courts sometimes conservatively apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
battle new and evolving illegal conduct.  See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 102 (recognizing that 
improvements in communication and travel make it likely that crimes will occur outside 
U.S. territory); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying 
laws extraterritorially to computer hacking committed abroad). 
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States’s customary approach is akin to legal isolationism—essentially, 
unless otherwise indicated, U.S. laws do not extend to actions outside of 
its territory and are not flexible enough to do so.120  But the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is simply a judicially created standard, and 
“there is no evidence” indicating that Congress prefers this approach.121  
It is conceivable that exceptions to this standard, such as the one created 
in Bowman, are an appropriate and alternative means of handling 
heinous, unpredictable offenses that demand immediate justice.122 
The purpose of the presumption may be a separation of powers 
issue.123  Viewed within this context, the presumption restrains courts 
from acting as legislatures and unilaterally amending the geographic 
scope of laws.124  The fact that Congress often explicitly prescribes 
extraterritoriality with respect to some laws demonstrates that Congress 
understands the importance of self-restraint when legislating.125  
                                                 
120 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (stating that Congress legislates 
domestic matters, not foreign ones).  Laws that are silent on the issue of extraterritoriality 
do not apply extraterritorially.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.  Unilateral application of laws is 
unwise and may leave the United States susceptible to foreign law as well.  Parrish, supra 
note 32, at 1491.  However, the approach of strictly applying the presumption might 
prevent the United States from fulfilling international obligations.  Colangelo, supra note 9, 
at 1034. 
121 Knox, supra note 12, at 647.  The presumption is purely a judicial creation and there is 
no code instructing such an approach.  Id.  Courts sometimes appear to be more concerned 
with avoiding extraterritoriality than Congress.  Id. 
122 See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing how the 
Bowman exception allows extraterritoriality to “be inferred from the nature of the offense[] 
and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate” similar types of crimes (quoting United 
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 
1307–08 (11th Cir. 1998))); Clopton, supra note 14, 166–71 (discussing how Bowman can be 
considered an exception to the presumption and is often utilized to immediately address 
certain types of criminal offenses). 
123 Knox, supra note 13, at 386 (explaining that the separation of powers concerns express 
“a general reluctance for the judicial branch to insert itself into questions of foreign policy, 
which should be left to Congress and the executive”). 
124 Id.  Questions of international relations may be better left to Congress than to courts.  
Id.  But the presumption against extraterritoriality is possibly an overly aggressive 
approach to the separation of powers.  See id. (explaining that the separation of powers 
informs courts that they are not in a proper position to determine foreign affairs, now that 
they must narrowly interpret laws). 
125 Id. at 396.  “Congress normally expects its statutes to be construed to avoid 
inadvertent conflicts with other countries, to address domestic concerns, and to respect the 
separation of powers in the U.S. government.”  Id.  For example, in United States v. Azeem, 
the Second Circuit stated, “In general, congressional consideration of an issue in one 
context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes implies that Congress intends to 
include that issue only where it has so indicated.”  946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added) (citing United States v. Diaz, 712 F.2d 36, 39 (2nd Cir. 1983)).  However, this was 
explicitly ignored in United States v. Bin Laden, which found that, even though two similar 
statutes differed only in their territorial prescription, courts are not forced to presume that 
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Similarly, the Court’s language in Morrison conceivably promotes 
judicial-restraint.126  Nevertheless, it is arguable that Congress tacitly 
approves of a court’s interpretation of a statute’s territorial reach unless 
it amends the statute post-decision.127 
In Morrison, the Court articulated its insistence on a strong 
presumption against extraterritoriality.128  Curiously enough, however, 
in making its ultimate determination, the majority in Morrison 
circumvented extraterritoriality.129  Instead, the Court “localized” the 
law—that is, they treated the case as a purely domestic issue that did not 
call for extraterritoriality.130  The Court’s approach in Morrison modifies 
                                                                                                             
the one silent on territorial scope does not apply extraterritorially.  92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
126 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (discussing the 
Court’s duty to respect the meaning of the statute as provided by Congress and 
recognizing Congress’s ability to prescribe laws extraterritorially when such language is 
provided). 
127 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 148 (discussing the frequency of extraterritoriality 
interpretation and postulating that Congress may leave such interpretation to the courts).  
It might be presumed that a court’s interpretation of the territorial reach of a statute is valid 
unless Congress actively amends the reach of the statute in question following a judgment.  
See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65, 1871 (June 25, 2010) (extending extraterritoriality to some 
provisions of the U.S. Securities Act following the court’s ruling in Morrison); Frank, 599 
F.3d at 1232 (“Congress has . . . amended its laws to allow for extraterritorial application 
when it has discovered loopholes in its statutory scheme.” (citing Baker, 609 F.2d at 137–
38)); Clopton, supra note 14, 153 n.74 (discussing how Title VII was amended to apply 
extraterritorially after the Supreme Court’s decision in Aramco). 
128 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78.  A strict presumption against extraterritoriality was by 
no means a new development for the Court.  See supra note 101 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s continued endorsement of a presumption against extraterritoriality).  The Court in 
Morrison attempted to avoid creating a “clear statement” rule and stated that a law need 
not say “this law applies abroad” in order to apply extraterritorially.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 
2883.  In interpreting the territorial reach of a law, “context can be consulted as well.”  Id.  
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, strongly disagreed with the majority’s holding 
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none,” going so far as to refer to it as “dictum.”  Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Stevens stated that, in interpreting whether a law applies extraterritorially, “evidence 
legitimately encompasses more than the enacted text.”  Id.  Even though the majority 
disputed Stevens’s claim, it failed to elaborate on how instructive context actually is.  
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1043.  In order to provide full clarity, the inclusion of language 
such as “this law applies abroad” may actually be much more constructive to interpreting 
extraterritoriality.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.  It is not uncommon to find such language 
located within the text of some statutes.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (prescribing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to terrorist acts transcending national boundaries). 
129 See Dodge, supra note 101, at 693 (explaining how Morrison refocused “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality on the location of the effects”). 
130 Id. at 691.  In his article, Dodge notes that, since Congress is concerned primarily with 
domestic conditions, focusing a statute domestically makes logical sense.  Id.  This 
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the focus of the act from one that emphasizes its extraterritorial nature to 
one that emphasizes domestic repercussions.131  In evaluating domestic 
repercussions, the Court utilized an effects test.132  By relying on 
domestic effects to avoid extraterritoriality, the Court resurrected “an 
outdated private international law approach,” which has been “largely 
abandoned for its reliance on the formalist fiction that multi-
jurisdictional claims can be ‘localized’ to a single territory.”133  This 
approach allows federal laws to apply extraterritorially without reliance 
on any extraterritorial indication, so long as courts focus on the domestic 
effects of the act.134 
                                                                                                             
approach essentially waives the presumption, resulting in what appears to be localization 
and an attempt to avoid a conflict of laws.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080. 
131 Dodge, supra note 101, at 690.  Despite the presence of foreign activity within this case, 
the Court took a strictly domestic approach.  Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685. 
132 See Dodge, supra note 101, at 692 (“Morrison substituted a narrower effects test that 
turns solely on the location of the specific transaction affected by the fraud.”) (footnote 
omitted).  In Morrison, the Court criticized the Second Circuit for utilizing an effects test to 
find extraterritoriality; however, in its analysis, the Court also used an effects test to 
determine whether the law could apply domestically.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81 
(criticizing lower courts for attempting to discern Congressional intent of extraterritoriality 
by using the effects test without “put[ting] forward a textual or even extratextual basis for 
these tests”).  To comprehend the Court’s reasoning, it must be understood that the effects 
test used by the Second Circuit was, according to the majority in Morrison, vague and 
unpredictable and forced courts to combine effects and then weigh them against the United 
States’s interests.  Dodge, supra note 101, 691–92. 
133 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1040.  Instead of applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court simply localized the effects.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881–84.  
Such localization is “reminiscent of the traditional approach to conflict of laws”; however, 
there was no conflict of laws issue in Morrison.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080 (footnote 
omitted); see also Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685 & n.152 (discussing how this particular 
approach of localization is an archaic means of avoiding conflict of laws by focusing solely 
on the domestic aspect of the case and relying on this focus to exclude other pertinent 
factors).  It should be recognized that past multijurisdictional cases that have utilized the 
effects test at least recognized that the statute in question was in fact being used in an 
extraterritorial manner.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) 
(finding that civil provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when an act has 
substantial effects within the United States); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 
(1993) (finding that a federal tort law did not apply extraterritorially because it had no 
domestic effect); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–100 (1922) (finding that a statute 
prohibiting conspiracies to defraud the United States applies extraterritorially to foreign 
conduct that has an effect within the United States). 
134 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045.  Morrison communicates that Courts can avoid 
conflicts of law and the presumption of extraterritoriality by simply focusing on the local 
effects of the crime.  Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685.  This approach now allows domestic 
laws to regulate international conduct and allows extraterritoriality without expressly 
stating so.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46.  In essence, this approach promotes the 
practice of ignoring extraterritoriality as long as the effects principle applies.  Dodge, supra 
note 101, at 690–92.  In her assessment of the Court’s emphasis on the focus of statutes in 
Morrison, Lea Brilmayer notes: 
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On its face, localization allows courts to avoid the issue of 
extraterritoriality altogether; however, in practice, this approach is not an 
adequate means of handling legitimate international conflicts of law and 
discord among nations.135  To put it bluntly, if a law is being used to 
prosecute effects or conduct that occurs abroad, it is being used 
extraterritorially, regardless of its domestic effects.136  Instead of 
promoting predictability and uniformity, Morrison promotes the use of 
judicial loopholes and creativity to avoid extraterritoriality.137  Under 
Morrison, courts can now determine whether a law applies 
extraterritorially and consider whether the conduct in question has any 
effect within the United States, thus giving courts “two bites at the 
apple.”138 
                                                                                                             
Rather than undertaking a thankless (and probably fruitless) search for 
indications about what Congress wanted, a court need only decide that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is inapplicable because the 
“focus” of the substantive law in question is something that took place 
in the United States.  The irony is that the evidentiary standard needed 
to invoke the loophole [to avoid the presumption against 
extraterritoriality]—which no one pretends has been authorized by 
Congress—is considerably lower than the evidentiary standard needed 
to satisfy the presumption—a presumption that supposedly reflects 
what Congress wanted. 
Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 663–64. 
135 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46.  Regardless of localization, if there is more than 
one jurisdiction involved, there is inevitably possible interference with a nation’s 
sovereignty or conflict of law.  Id.  Applying a law extraterritorially and utilizing principles 
of international law to achieve such application may be preferable because this approach 
directly conforms to international law.  See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming 
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that laws should be construed in a manner 
that is compatible with and does not violate international law).  But see supra note 39 
(discussing how the United States is neither constrained nor subordinate to international 
law). 
136 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 123 (“[A] law is extraterritorial if it governs acts that occur 
outside the nation-state’s borders, even if committed by the nation’s own citizens.”) 
(footnote omitted).  Simply localizing a crime does not suspend the reality that a law is 
being used extraterritorially.  Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1040; see also Brilmayer, supra note 
89, at 685 & n.152 (discussing how localization is an archaic means of attempting to avoid 
conflict of laws). 
137 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46; see Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 667–68 (explaining 
that the effects test gives rise to “judicial creativity” because it allows courts to shift their 
analysis onto the “focus” of the law). 
138 Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 663.  Morrison appears to make it easier for courts to base 
their interpretation of the geographic scope of a statute on judicially created concepts 
rather than on the intentions of Congress.  Id. at 663–64; see Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045 
(discussing how the creativity of the Court in Morrison gives lower courts multiple means 
of applying laws extraterritorially without explicitly stating so). 
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Nevertheless, Morrison, read narrowly, reasserts domestic borders to 
territorially ambiguous laws.139  But the pressing necessity of such a 
reassertion is suspect—especially when, before Morrison, courts were 
applying § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (the statute in question in 
Morrison) extraterritorially for forty years.140  Surely forty years of such 
an application qualifies as tacit consent from Congress.141  In fact, 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, Congress amended 
the U.S. Securities Act to expressly allow extraterritorial application of 
some sections.142  The blanket approach of a presumption against 
extraterritoriality significantly curbs the application of laws and prevents 
the United States from taking part in the international legal 
community.143  More importantly, the presumption often fails to 
effectively promote modern legal concerns of the United States, such as 
terrorism, economic crimes, and cyber crimes.144  A loosened approach to 
the presumption against extraterritoriality would more adequately bring 
such acts to justice.145 
                                                 
139 Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1026. 
140 Id. at 1080; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated 
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (declaring that § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act applies extraterritorially). 
141 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2890–91 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how Congress’s 
failure to reject courts’ extraterritorial interpretation of securities laws amounted to tacit 
approval); Knox, supra note 13, at 385 (discussing how, if courts interpret a statute in a 
manner inconsistent with Congress’s intent, Congress would assuredly overrule courts by 
amending the statute). 
142 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65, 1871 (2010) (June 25, 2010) (extending extraterritoriality to 
some provisions of the U.S. Securities Act following the court’s ruling in Morrison). 
143 See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1036–37 (discussing how the blanket approach to the 
presumption does not help achieve U.S. interests).  One of the most damaging effects of 
Morrison is that it declares that the blanket presumption against extraterritoriality exists 
“regardless of whether there is a risk of” conflict of laws.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78.  
Now, the only existing justification for the presumption is that Congress normally 
legislates with regard to domestic issues.  Dodge, supra note 101, at 688–89. 
144 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (noting how the presumption approach may not 
adequately handle new-age crimes). 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on the 
exception to a presumption against extraterritoriality in Bowman to apply a statute 
criminalizing conspiracies to attack commercial aircraft extraterritorially); United States v. 
Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374–75 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying a statute criminalizing cyber 
fraud extraterritorially); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(relying on Bowman to apply a statute prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction 
extraterritorially regardless of the actor’s nationality). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 27
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/27
2013] Extraterritorial Confusion 659 
B. Manipulating Statutory Construction to Create Extraterritoriality 
Extraterritoriality can be just as problematic as the presumption 
against it.146  In exercising extraterritoriality, courts generally examine 
the construction and nature of the statute, public policy implications, and 
the principles of international law.147  This practice began with Bowman, 
and following this decision the floodgates began to slowly open and 
other courts began to find extraterritorial language within statutory 
construction.148  Subsequent cases expanded Bowman, and criminal 
statutes were generally more likely to be granted extraterritorial reach.149 
In Bowman, the Court recognized that a strict adherence to a 
presumption against extraterritoriality is inadequate in handling 
emerging world issues.150  Bowman’s use of international principles and 
focus on the evolution of technology to justify extraterritoriality attempts 
                                                 
146 Podgor & Filler, supra note 10, at 592 (discussing how liberally applying laws 
extraterritorially is problematic within the current global environment in which many 
nations seek to enforce respective interests). 
147 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922); see supra notes 34–38 and 
accompanying text (discussing the approaches to interpreting the territorial scope of 
federal statutes that are geoambiguous).  These principles are utilized in an attempt to 
comport with the Charming Betsy canon and to avoid conflicts of law.  Meyer, supra note 8, 
at 143. 
148 See Clopton, supra note 14, at 139 (noting that Bowman’s use of the protective principle 
of international law to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of fraud against the 
U.S. government opened the door to extraterritorial application of other federal criminal 
laws).  The Supreme Court has also allowed states to apply their statutes extraterritorially 
to their citizens if the state has a legitimate interest and it does not violate an act of 
Congress.  See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (allowing Florida to apply its 
laws extraterritorially). 
149 See Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Bowman 
to not apply to all cases and stating that, under Bowman, “only criminal statutes, and 
perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed 
against it, are exempt from the presumption [against extraterritoriality]” (citing Bowman, 
260 U.S. at 98; United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 100–01 (9th Cir. 1991))).  However, 
after Bowman, courts have interpreted some civil laws to apply extraterritorially as well.  
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (finding that civil 
provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when foreign conduct produces a 
“substantial effect in the United States”); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–747 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (finding that Morrison and the presumption against extraterritoriality do not 
prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially).  There is a legitimate 
possibility that courts may begin regularly interpreting Morrison to apply to criminal 
statutes as well.  See Clopton, supra note 14, at 181 (“A court looking at an ambiguous 
criminal statute may treat Morrison as the straw that broke Bowman’s back, requiring a 
stringent presumption in criminal as well as civil cases.”). 
150 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 136–37 (discussing the Court’s departure from strictly 
territorial jurisdiction and “emerging international law” at the time of the Bowman 
decision). 
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to harmonize international law and constitutional requirements.151  The 
Court in Bowman limited such an interpretation of laws to criminal 
offenses committed against the government.152  Yet, modern courts often 
allow for extraterritoriality when the government is not the victim.153 
Bowman did not excuse courts from making an ultimate 
determination regarding a statute’s ability to apply extraterritorially.154  
Nevertheless, extraterritoriality is sometimes determined on a case-by-
case basis regardless of the territorial scope of the law in question, such 
as when the statute is an ancillary one dependent on another statute.155  
                                                 
151 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–100 (citing to “the right of the government to defend 
itself,” that is, the protective principle of international law, to justify extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and application).  “[A]lthough principles of international law might not 
determine conclusively the constitutionality of Congress’s extraterritorial legislative reach, 
they nonetheless inform the analysis.”  Colangelo, supra note 26, at 169 (footnote omitted).  
Giving statutes extraterritorial effect simply because an international principle of law could 
be applicable would not alleviate international discord.  Knox, supra note 13, at 382–83. 
152 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.  The Court in Bowman declined to extend such a reading to 
crimes committed against individuals, stating: 
Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, 
murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and frauds 
of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the community 
must, of course, be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
government where it may properly exercise it.  If punishment of them 
is to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict 
territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, 
and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this 
regard. 
Id. 
153 See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
a statute prohibiting violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity applied extraterritorially, 
even though the United States was not a victim of the crime, because not doing so would 
undermine the scope and effectiveness of the law); see also supra note 72 (discussing cases in 
which the government was not the victim and extraterritoriality was found).  
Unfortunately, it does not appear that extraterritoriality will apply when aquatic mammals 
are the victims.  See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002–05 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding 
that the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 does not apply extraterritorially, because 
such an application would attempt to regulate the resource development and sovereign 
territory of another state). 
154 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97, 102 (noting that extraterritoriality is a question of statutory 
construction and finding that legislative intent must be fairly construed in determining 
whether a law applies extraterritorially). 
155 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (reading Bowman as 
allowing courts to infer congressional intent for extraterritoriality based on the “the nature 
of the offenses and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime 
involved”); see also Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49 (“Although insisting on a need for a clear 
showing of congressional intent to apply its law abroad, the courts in practice sometimes 
follow the judicial unilateralist approach to allow extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
without explicit support in the text of the statute or legislative history.”) (footnote omitted).  
Ancillary statutes are dependent on another crime and often do not contain extraterritorial 
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When determining the nature and purpose of the statute, courts 
sometimes make reflexive presumptions that extraterritoriality is 
implied.156  It is common for criminal laws to apply extraterritorially if a 
court believes that the situation involves imperative public policy and an 
international principle of law can be used to reach such conduct.157 
However, questions of public policy are better left for Congress as 
opposed to courts, and courts walk a fine line in violating a separation of 
                                                                                                             
language; however, courts usually interpret such statutes to apply extraterritorially.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 812–13 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a conspiracy 
to commit a crime may apply extraterritorially when the underlying act itself applies 
extraterritorially); United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(finding that a statute criminalizing the use of a firearm to commit a violent crime applied 
extraterritorially when the underlying crime applies extraterritorially). 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230–33 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting a 
statute prohibiting sex tourism to apply extraterritorially because of the extraterritorial 
language found in similar statutes).  Courts have claimed that extraterritoriality can be 
inferred from some statutes based on the nature of the crime.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that a federal law prohibiting 
encouragement of illegal immigration into the United States applied extraterritorially 
because it was “fundamentally international”); Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839 n.4 (finding 
that crimes furthering drug-trafficking enterprises apply extraterritorially, because drug-
trafficking by its “very nature” is international); Baker, 609 F.2d at 136 (stating that 
extraterritoriality can be inferred based on the nature of the offense and similar “legislative 
efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved”); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 
(9th Cir. 1967) (finding that federal smuggling statutes applied extraterritorially, because 
“smuggling by its very nature involves foreign countries”). 
157 See, e.g., United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the extraterritorial effect of laws can be inferred, especially when an alternative 
reading would undermine the statute, and that the principles of international law can 
establish extraterritorial application); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 
(9th Cir. 1984) (“Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any one of 
the five principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 
851 (9th Cir. 1976))); King, 552 F.2d at 850–51 (recognizing that criminal laws may be 
applied extraterritorially based on the international principles of law, so long as the act has 
an adverse impact within the United States); see also Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, 
Federal Criminal Statutes, in 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:9 
(2011) (stating that a “common approach” to extraterritoriality with regard to criminal 
statutes “is to ignore the presumption where limiting the territorial reach of the statute 
substantially frustrates its effectiveness”) (footnote omitted).  Courts no longer limit 
themselves to the holding in Bowman and often “consider policy justifications,” as well as 
“comprehensive statutory scheme[s],” when interpreting extraterritoriality.  Clopton, supra 
note 14, at 170–71; see, e.g., Frank, 599 F.3d at 1231 (finding that a statute prohibiting the 
buying and selling of children applies extraterritorially, because it “is part of a 
comprehensive scheme created by Congress to eradicate the sexual exploitation of children 
and eliminate child pornography, and therefore warrants a broad sweep”) (citations 
omitted); Baker, 609 F.2d at 136–37 (holding that statutes combating drug-trafficking 
applied extraterritorially, because they were “part of a comprehensive legislative scheme 
designed to halt drug abuse in the United States”). 
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powers issue when they take such considerations head-on.158  The fact 
that Congress explicitly constructs some laws to apply extraterritorially 
and regularly amends the territorial reach of statutes demonstrates that it 
is aware that the absence of extraterritorial language means that it will 
only be construed to apply domestically.159  However, all of this may be 
legal fiction—the possibility exists that inaction after a statute is granted 
or denied extraterritorial reach demonstrates congressional approval 
because an unsatisfactory determination would result in intervention.160 
Courts must look to the purpose and nature of a statute to determine 
territorial scope, but extraterritoriality is essentially a matter of “national 
interests” implicating international law.161  The United States typically 
uses the international principles of law to establish jurisdiction and 
                                                 
158 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (discussing how the separation of 
powers prevents courts from unilaterally amending or over-extending the territorial scope 
of federal laws).  “Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the 
state.”  Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931) (citations 
omitted); see United States v. Funez-Pineda, No. 5:11-cr-14, 2011 WL 5024364, at *9 n.7 (D. 
Vt. Oct. 20, 2011) (“It is the legislatures, not the courts, which are tasked with making the 
public policy determination of whether certain conduct constitutes a crime.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Blomquist, supra note 31, at 452–53 (discussing how courts often face 
problems of “knowledge,” “conduct,” and “governance” when reviewing national security 
laws and policy making). 
159 See supra note 127 (discussing amendments expanding the territorial scope of some 
statutes).  The Supreme Court presumes that Congress is aware of the Court’s decisions.  
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–99 (1979) (“[I]t is not only appropriate but also 
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important 
precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be 
interpreted in conformity with them.”).  But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337 n.12 (1991) (stating that the 
same cannot be said of lower court decisions and noting that Congress is usually unaware 
of many of them).  If this is true, then Congress should be aware of the Supreme Court’s 
consistent preservation of a presumption against extraterritoriality and therefore legislate 
with this in mind.  See supra note 101 (listing Supreme Court cases over the last 100 years 
that consistently refer to the presumption against extraterritoriality).  Congress’s insistence 
on including extraterritorial language in some statutes, but not others, is further indication 
that Congress understands how courts will interpret the scope of statutes.  See United 
States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In general, congressional consideration of 
an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes implies that 
Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated.”) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
160 See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that 
congressional inaction after judicial interpretation of a statute results in acceptance or 
agreement of such an interpretation). 
161 See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11 (explaining that extraterritorial application is a question 
of national interest); see also Blomquist, supra note 31, at 457 (discussing how “constantly 
shifting” public policies and national values shape the United States’s national security 
interests).  Under Bowman, protecting national interests was determined to outweigh the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  See Clopton, supra note 14, at 169 (explaining that 
the Court in Bowman came to its decision by relying on the interests of the government).  
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accommodate international norms.162  But one has to wonder whether 
the consistent appearance of the international principles when 
evaluating jurisdiction has less to do with due process and more to do 
with justifying territorial expansion of federal laws to the international 
community.163  Incorporating international law via due process may, in 
practice, guide the extraterritorial application of federal laws.164  But 
                                                 
162 See Porto, supra note 65, § 2 (discussing the international principles and how they 
relate to extraterritorial jurisdiction).  When seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
crimes, courts consider whether exercising such jurisdiction is consistent with international 
law.  Id.  Even in cases where the courts rejected the authority of international law, many 
still applied the principles of international law in finding extraterritorial jurisdiction.  See 
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that, although U.S. laws 
are not subordinate to international customary laws, the crime at hand met the 
requirements of the protective principle under international law); United States v. Bin 
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 214, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that international law could be 
overridden by Congress, but holding that the protective principle allowed for the law at 
issue to apply extraterritorially).  Some suggest that the use of international principles 
should be the nexus norm for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction.  See Colangelo, supra 
note 26, at 166 (stating that, absent a nexus connecting a defendant to the United States, 
international principles are an efficient means of “ensur[ing]” that extraterritorial 
application is not arbitrary or unfair).  The purpose of a nexus is to put the actor on notice 
that he may be subject to the laws of the United States.  Id. at 162–63.  However, some 
circuits have gone so far as to hold that no nexus needs to exist to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over some acts.  See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that no nexus between the defendant and the United States is required to apply 
the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act extraterritorially); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 
F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act can be applied 
extraterritorially without a jurisdictional nexus); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 
F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Inasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned 
universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally 
unfair’ for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics 
on the high seas.”). 
163 See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 162–63 (examining extraterritoriality with respect to 
due process).  In this sense, the international principles have a dual use:  they help to 
establish extraterritoriality and fulfill constitutional requirements.  Id.  Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is essentially stretched according to national interests, and national interests 
often serve as the basis for extraterritorial application.  Id. at 164.  While American notions 
of territoriality have been drawn from international law, these eventually evolved “to 
reflect American national interests.”  KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE 
FLAG?  THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 7 (2009).  As a result, territory 
is not static, and it “has been stretched and pulled over time in an effort to achieve national 
ends within the existing international order.”  Id. 
164 See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 167 (explaining that international law will help 
determine whether a certain application of international law comports with due process).  
Such an incorporation of international law “both expands the United States’ ability to extend 
its laws to conduct outside U.S. territory, and effectively addresses a major objection to the 
imposition of due process limits on federal extraterritorial legislation.”  Id.  But this 
approach can cause courts to “lose sight of the ultimate question:  would application of the 
statute to the defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?”  United States v. Davis, 905 
F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).  Once again, the issue of extraterritorial application ties in 
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using the international principles of law to establish extraterritorial 
application is problematic and still involves a violation of foreign 
sovereignty.165  Additionally, these principles, even though they comport 
with international law, are so overbroad that they “are readily 
susceptible to misapplication” and may be used in a manner that is 
unfair or arbitrary.166  Relying on these principles to obtain 
extraterritoriality is a double edged sword:  while the five principles of 
international law provide protection to the United States and its citizens, 
they also subject these same classes to foreign laws.167  This puts the 
United States and its citizens in special danger when a nation is 
determined to pursue its self-interests.168  Furthermore, such use allows 
judges to act as lawmakers and amend statutes by applying them 
extraterritorially, once again raising a separation of powers issue.169 
                                                                                                             
the underlining issue of constitutional constraints, which this Note will not fully delve into; 
but it should be recognized that some courts have used the principles of international law 
to find extraterritoriality, while others have used them as a nexus to due process.  See 
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 167–70 (discussing the use of international legal principles in 
establishing a nexus between conduct and the United States). 
165 See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1084–86 (describing how using the international 
principles of law to obtain extraterritoriality disrespects the sovereignty of foreign states). 
166 Meyer, supra note 8, at 150; see also Colangelo, supra note 26, at 168–69 (explaining that 
if the international principles can be used to apply domestic laws abroad, due process 
would be the only true constraint on extraterritoriality); supra note 105 (discussing how the 
international principles of law lack guiding criteria and can be easily manipulated to 
stretch federal laws universally). 
167 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150–51 (stating that using these principles encourages 
harmonization with international laws and norms but also jeopardizes the nation and its 
citizens); Parrish, supra note 32, at 1505 (discussing how unilateral application of laws 
leaves the United States vulnerable to foreign law). 
168 See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 47, at 888–91 (discussing international complications 
caused by the Belgian War Crimes Statute).  A good example of an abuse and overuse of 
international norms and principles is the Belgian War Crimes Statute, which was repealed 
in 2003.  Id. at 891.  Under this law, Belgium granted universal jurisdiction over war crime 
claims.  Id. at 889.  Soon, the Belgian courts became flooded with claims.  Id.  In many cases, 
it appeared that the claims were strictly political.  Id. at 891.  Many nations were unsatisfied 
with the law and believed that it disrespected sovereignty.  Id.  Belgium finally repealed the 
law after the threat of sanctions from several nations.  Id.  This statute demonstrates an 
abusive use of unilateral laws that are given extraterritorial effect based on international 
law.  Id. at 888. 
169 See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1039 (explaining that by construing geographically 
silent statutes extraterritorially, courts are able to use modern international rules of 
jurisdiction to amend statutes in a way that could interfere with the rights of other 
sovereigns).  It may be possible for courts to use international rules to amend 
geoambiguous statutes to force them to apply extraterritorially, thus encroaching on the 
sovereign rights of other nations.  Id.  The principles of international law may be better 
suited as a means to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction and due process as opposed to an 
extraterritorial gauge.  See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2 (finding that the principles of 
international law may be used to establish a nexus and fulfill due process requirements). 
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The effects and protective principles of international law seem to 
evaluate policy concerns and are the most commonly cited principles 
regarding conduct that threatens the government, such as piracy, 
terrorism, and cyber attacks.170  The two principles often intermingle, 
and, when applying the protective principle, courts consider the effects 
or intended effects within the United States.171  Nevertheless, the exact 
interpretation of the protective principle has been questioned over the 
years, given that these principles can be used regardless as to whether an 
act has an effect on the United States.172  This alternative use of the 
protective principle demonstrates how easily it can be manipulated and 
abused.173  Additionally, the United States traditionally uses a lower 
standard of proof for the effects test, and such a deviation from the 
norms practiced by the international community calls into question the 
international legality of the United States’s approach.174  If such 
treatment of the effects test is, in fact, illegal under international law, 
                                                 
170 Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 33, at 22 (explaining that the protective principle allows 
jurisdiction over conduct potentially harming the state); see United States v. Bowman, 260 
U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (using the protective principle to safeguard essential state interests that 
are threatened); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the 
protective principle to combat terrorism). 
171 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f (1987).  “The protective 
principle may be seen as a special application of the effects principle . . . but it has been 
treated as an independent basis of jurisdiction.”  Id.  Under the Restatement, the protective 
principle and the effects test are equated with territoriality.  Meyer, supra note 8, at 147.  
Laws can be applied extraterritorially to reach acts that intended an effect as well.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 
that laws prohibiting drug-trafficking applied extraterritorially via the protective principle, 
because not doing so would undermine the scope and effectiveness of the law, even though 
the United States was not an actual victim of the crime). 
173 Meyer, supra note 8, at 153–54.  The effects test and protective principle are vague at 
best, providing no clear definition establishing what qualifies as “substantial” effects or 
state interests.  Id.  This makes the protective principle and, in effect, the effects test easy to 
manipulate and prone to bias.  Id.  The effects test might better serve as a tool to meet due 
process and nexus requirements rather than as a means of giving statutes extraterritorial 
effect.  See, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 112 (using the “substantial intended effect[s]” test to 
fulfill due process requirements); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918–19 (9th Cir. 
1998) (using the effects test to establish due process over an extraterritorial act). 
174 See Nijenhuis, supra note 52, at 1036 (discussing how the United States’s standard of 
proof of effects is usually lower than that of other nations and may be illegal under 
international law); see also Parrish, supra note 32, at 1480 (“The ease with which [U.S.] courts 
employ the effects test is troublesome . . . .”).  Although the effects test has become 
recognized by several other nations, the United States’s broad approach has, in the past, 
sparked international protest.  Id. at 1491–92.  The Supreme Court has criticized lower 
courts’ use of the effects test to determine congressional intent without “put[ting] forward 
a textual or even extratextual basis for these tests.”  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 
S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010). 
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then the United States would risk violating the Charming Betsy canon 
every time the principle was summoned.175 
While the United States would like to apply the international 
principle of universal jurisdiction over some conduct, such as terrorism, 
such an application would be ill-advised.176  Definitions of particular 
crimes vary by country, and such a difference in definition is critical 
enough to deter unilateral declaration of universal law.177  However, it is 
possible for the United States to influence international recognition of 
universal laws through the enactment of treaties.178  Through actively 
prescribing universal reach over particular conduct, the United States 
might assist in creating a norm that may eventually become globally 
accepted.179 
But eliminating the use of the international principles would not 
altogether stop courts from applying geoambiguous laws 
extraterritorially—some lower courts utilize broad, boilerplate language 
within statutes to interpret extraterritoriality.180  For example, when 
                                                 
175 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
176 See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 106–08 & 107 n.42 (explaining that there is a lack of an 
international consensus on what type of misconduct qualifies as terrorism, and applying 
terrorism laws universally may cause disaccord among nations).  For this reason, the 
Second District Court of Appeals held that terrorism is not subject to universal jurisdiction 
because international law has failed to produce a uniform definition.  Id. at 97, 103.  But see 
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1094–95 (discussing how widespread acceptance of treaties 
acknowledging terroristic acts as crimes create an international norm by which acts of 
terrorism fall under universal jurisdiction).  Furthermore, terrorism is a complicated issue 
in and of itself, especially considering that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter.”  United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005). 
177 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing how the definition of 
particular crimes may vary from nation to nation, and applying a generally unrecognized 
definition of a particular crime universally is fundamentally unfair). 
178 Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
383, 395 (2001).  Treaties may be the best sources of evidence regarding the precise contours 
of universal jurisdiction.  Colangelo, supra note 47, at 904. 
179 Colangelo, supra note 47, at 907 (discussing how increased use of universal jurisdiction 
will help define and create acceptable norms). 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
term “foreign commerce” was not considered boilerplate in regards to a statute 
criminalizing sexual misconduct with minors and thus could be used to interpret 
extraterritoriality, despite discussing Morrison’s disapproval of the use of terms such as 
“foreign commerce” and other boilerplate language to interpret extraterritorial 
application); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
phrase “foreign commerce” could be used to indicate that the PROTECT Act applies 
extraterritorially); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 683–84 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(finding that broad terms, such as “any person” and “any crime” in an ancillary statute, 
could be used to interpret extraterritoriality); see also United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 
160 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that, with regard to extraterritoriality, “[w]here the power of the 
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analyzing the nature and purpose of laws, some courts have given 
statutes extraterritorial application based solely on broad language and 
phrases, such as “foreign commerce,” even though the Supreme Court 
has discouraged such practices.181  Even when such language is absent, 
courts have “interpreted” extraterritorial intent solely on the treatment of 
laws concerning similar crimes, even when their statutory construction 
differs.182  These types of practices have been discouraged as well,183  and 
                                                                                                             
Congress is clear, and the language of exercise is broad . . . [there is] no duty to construe a 
[criminal] statute narrowly”). 
181 See supra note 180 (discussing cases using statutory language, such as “foreign 
commerce,” to interpret extraterritorial application); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank 
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882–83 (2010) (holding that statutes that contain broad terms, such as 
“foreign commerce,” do not apply extraterritorially without any further “affirmative 
indication” of such application); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251–
53 (1991) (holding that boilerplate phrases, such as “foreign commerce,” cannot be used to 
interpret congressional intent regarding extraterritorial application).  But see United States 
v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that broad statutory language, 
such as “interstate or foreign commerce,” indicates that Congress intended for crimes of 
selling or buying children to apply extraterritorially). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that 
extraterritoriality “may be inferred from the nature of the offenses and Congress’ other 
legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved”).  Some statutes are given 
extraterritorial effect because they are part of a “comprehensive statutory scheme” to 
combat particular conduct, even if extraterritorial language is not indicated within the 
statutes.  Clopton, supra note 14, at 170–71.  There appears to be two types of crimes that are 
particularly susceptible to such an analysis; the first are child pornography laws.  See Frank, 
599 F.3d at 1231 (finding that statutes combating child pornography are part of a 
“comprehensive scheme” created by Congress to “eliminate child pornography” and thus 
apply extraterritorially); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that Congress created a “comprehensive scheme” to combat child pornography that 
required extraterritorial application); United States v. Martens, 59 M.J. 501, 504 (C.A.A.F. 
2003) (finding that a geoambiguous statute criminalizing the distributing or receiving of 
child pornography was part of a “comprehensive statutory scheme to eradicate sexual 
exploitation of children” and was intended to apply extraterritorially (quoting United 
States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990))).  The second are drug distribution 
laws.  See Baker, 609 F.2d at 137 (holding that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act was a “comprehensive legislative scheme” created to eradicate and control 
drug abuse within the United States and thus applied extraterritorially).  However, judicial 
decisions interpreting these “comprehensive statutory schemes” are not uniform.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that a 
statute criminalizing the intent to distribute a controlled substance did not apply 
extraterritorially despite similar efforts to combat such conduct); United States v. 
Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 59–61 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (finding that the Child Porn Protection Act 
does not contain any language indicating extraterritorial applicability and thus only applies 
domestically). 
183 See, e.g., United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ongressional 
consideration of an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes, 
implies that Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated.”) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); United States v. Diaz, 712 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that statutory language will not be implied when one statute is silent in regards to 
Walsh: Extraterritorial Confusion:  The Complex Relationship Between Bow
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
668 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
serve as a manifestation of aggressive judicial activism.184  As discussed 
earlier, courts seem to have no reservations with applying a law 
extraterritorially, so long as they consider the crime at hand to be one 
that carries public policy implications and national interests.185 
With Morrison, one would imagine that lower courts’ liberal use of 
extraterritoriality would diminish; however, subsequent cases indicate 
that courts have only been slightly deterred in extraterritorially applying 
federal laws.186  Morrison is often eschewed, and the international 
principles, as well as judicial activism and loose interpretations of the 
purpose and nature of statutes, continue to be used to obtain 
extraterritoriality.187  The current trend appears to be a loose reading of 
                                                                                                             
a particular issue but similar statutes address the exclusion).  At least one district court has 
held that statutory ambiguity does not prevent a finding of extraterritoriality if it is found 
that the statute was perhaps poorly authored.  See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 
223–24 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (interpreting a statute criminalizing the murder of an 
“internationally protected person” to apply extraterritoriality even without clear statutory 
language, because it was legislated to meet treaty obligations that were not explicitly found 
within the statute). 
184 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 
VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 550–51 (1997) (explaining the dangers of judicial activism, especially 
within the context of international law and extraterritoriality); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 861 (1997) (discussing judicial activism and how judges lack 
the competence to make decisions regarding foreign affairs); Clopton, supra note 14, at 153–
54 (discussing the dangers of judicial activism, especially when it implicates foreign 
governments). 
185 See Nanda & Pansius, supra note 157, § 8:9 (explaining that the “‘importance’ of 
enforcing [a] criminal law” is a determining factor for extraterritorial application and that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is often ignored when it “substantially 
frustrates” a statute’s effectiveness); supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the 
influence of public policy and national interests in applying laws extraterritorially). 
186 See supra notes 95, 98 (listing cases discussing the treatment of extraterritoriality post-
Morrison).  Generally, it appears that courts prefer to rely on Bowman in criminal cases, 
despite the clear language that Morrison applies in all cases.  Id.  While it initially appeared 
that Morrison controlled all civil statutes, the Ninth Circuit has determined that Morrison 
does not prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–47 (9th Cir. 2011). 
187 See supra notes 95, 98 (discussing how courts have consistently interpreted 
extraterritoriality after Morrison); see also sources cited, supra note 184 (discussing the 
dangers of judicial activism).  The Second Circuit appears to follow Bowman in criminal 
cases and Morrison in civil cases.  Compare Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 
F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Morrison and holding that civil RICO provisions do 
not apply extraterritorially), with United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(ignoring Morrison and citing Bowman in determining that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality does not apply to criminal statutes); United States v. Weingarten, 632 
F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging Morrison, but recognizing Bowman as 
controlling over criminal statutes, and using the term “foreign commerce” to establish 
extraterritorial application over a statute criminalizing sexual misconduct with a minor, 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the presumption’s limits 
post-Morrison are unknown.188  Therefore, a new approach must be 
created that upholds the traditional presumption against 
extraterritoriality but allows laws to apply extraterritorially to especially 
heinous international acts that victimize the United States and its 
citizens.189 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The presumption against extraterritoriality serves as an obvious 
safeguard to prevent unauthorized extraterritorial application of federal 
laws without Congress’s consent; however, the international principles 
of law, particularly the effects and protective principles, are, in reality, 
the governing factors in obtaining extraterritoriality even when courts 
abstain from citing to them directly.190  While strict adherence to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has traditionally been useful in 
preventing judicial activism, national security concerns and the 
development of technology has made such an approach obsolete when 
handling criminal matters where prompt, immediate response takes 
priority over equivocal congressional provisions.191  To properly balance 
these two concerns, it is imperative for courts to take a new, uniform 
approach in determining the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes. 
                                                                                                             
despite discussing Morrison’s disapproval of using boilerplate terms to interpret 
extraterritoriality). 
188 See Parrish, supra note 32, at 1470–71 (discussing how the unrestrained definition of 
the effects test “marked the beginning of the end for meaningful territorial limits on 
legislative jurisdiction”).  Zachary D. Clopton, in his article Bowman Lives, posits that 
Morrison and Bowman adequately co-exist.  Clopton, supra note 14, at 184.  He notes that 
both cases relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality and the focus of the statute, 
as well as the Charming Betsy canon.  Id. at 184–85.  When analyzed in this manner, the 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality is guided by the statute’s focus.  
Id. 
189 See infra Part IV (discussing a new approach to extraterritoriality that holds true to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality while allowing for a specific exception to combat 
criminal conduct that threatens national security). 
190 See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(“Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any one of the five 
principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th 
Cir. 1976))).  As we have seen, the same can be said for extraterritorial jurisdiction as well.  
See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the principles of 
international law may be used to establish a nexus and fulfill due process requirements). 
191 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing how globalization and the 
development of technology calls for the government to increase its governing authority 
over conduct abroad). 
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Under this new approach, which can be referred to as the Modified-
Exception Test,192 courts will first evaluate the statute based on a strict 
reading of the presumption against extraterritoriality.193  Next, courts 
will evaluate the statute based on selected principles overtly discussed 
by the Supreme Court in Bowman.194  Finally, courts will look to the 
status of the accused and the nature of the alleged act.195  This test 
focuses specifically on the intended victim of the extraterritorial conduct, 
and inherently violent acts are weighed more heavily than non-violent 
acts.  This ideal test is one that would take into account both the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison and Bowman, as well as 
contemporary national security concerns, and attempt to balance them in 
a complimentary manner, rather than a conflicting one.  Such an 
approach would consider the simplified, bare-language of these cases in 
a three-step analysis in determining extraterritoriality. 
Under the first step, courts will evaluate a statute based on a strict 
reading of Aramco and Morrison.196  Using these two cases to start this 
analysis works directly to ensure a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.197  As the Supreme Court instructed in Morrison, 
“When a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it 
has none.”198  This holding would be combined with the “clear 
statement” rule in Aramco,199 and only the specific, non-boilerplate 
language will be used in determining the extraterritorial application of a 
statute.200  This approach abandons evaluating the context, legislative 
history, or similar federal laws in determining the extraterritorial effect 
                                                 
192 The name of this test is the creation of the author. 
193 See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text (explaining the strict application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality). 
194 See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text (using specific principles in Bowman to 
establish extraterritoriality). 
195 See infra notes 210–15 and accompanying text (explaining how the status and intent of 
an actor can guide extraterritorial application). 
196 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878, 2883 (2010) (stating that 
some activity or effect is not sufficient to establish extraterritorial application, and, in order 
for a statute to apply extraterritorially, a clear indication must be expressed within the 
statute’s context); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating 
that Congress must clearly express whether a statute can be used extraterritorially). 
197 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (promoting the traditional approach of a presumption 
against extraterritoriality in all cases). 
198 Id. at 2878. 
199 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (holding that statutes do not apply extraterritorially 
“unless there is ‘[an] affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” (quoting 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957))). 
200 See supra note 180 (discussing cases in which broad, boilerplate language was utilized 
to allow extraterritorial application). 
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of a statute because such considerations are easily manipulated.201  In 
addition, the localization approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
Morrison will be discarded,202 because localization gives courts excessive 
influence over the territorial aspects of an act, thus leaving statutes open 
to over-interpretation.203 
If, after the Morrison and Aramco evaluation, a statute is found to 
have no specific language indicating extraterritoriality, courts would 
proceed with evaluating the statute based on selected principles in 
Bowman.204  Under the Bowman evaluation, the courts will consider two 
issues:  first, whether the statute in question is criminal in nature;205 and, 
second, whether the conduct poses a direct threat to national security.206  
To successfully pass this analysis, the conduct in question must be 
criminal and not civil.207  The act must also be an actual threat to national 
security.  Such an analysis closely conforms to the protective principle of 
international law in that it allows the United States to properly protect 
itself from perceived threats.208  In order to qualify as a threat to national 
security, the act must specifically target either the U.S. government or its 
citizens because of their status or perceived status as U.S. citizens.209  In 
interpreting the threat, no consideration or reliance should be given to 
the secondary effects of the conduct.210  Admittedly, determining an 
actual threat to national security is a broad guideline.  Therefore, a 
sliding scale interpretation must be followed where violent actions are 
weighed more heavily than non-violent actions and conspiracies to 
commit crimes.211  Thus, a particularly destructive crime, such as a 
                                                 
201 See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text (discussing manipulative means of 
interpreting statutory language to find extraterritoriality). 
202 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in Morrison 
promoted localizing statutes as a way to avoid extraterritoriality and combat conduct 
committed abroad). 
203 See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (discussing how localization is 
manipulative and promotes judicial creativity). 
204 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
205 See id. at 98 (expressly allowing some criminal statutes to apply extraterritorially). 
206 See id. (allowing statutes that are “enacted because of the right of the government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated” to apply 
extraterritorially). 
207 See id. (extending extraterritoriality to only some criminal statutes). 
208 See supra note 45 (discussing the protective principle of international law). 
209 For example, under the Modified-Exception Test, an individual could be held 
criminally liable if he or she violently attacked a Liberian Embassy after confusing its flag 
for that of the United States. 
210 That is, the primary purpose of the act could only be perceived as one committed to 
cause injury to the United States or its citizens because of their status as U.S. citizens. 
211 Under this sliding scale, violent acts are granted more deference because of their 
immediate and often permanent effects, which are more easily measurable. 
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terrorist bombing, is more apt to be considered vulnerable to 
extraterritoriality.212  If, based on the Bowman evaluation, the conduct 
regulated by the statute in question is considered more violent than non-
violent, then there is an exception to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the specific case. 
However, if, based on the Bowman evaluation, the conduct regulated 
by the statute in question is considered more non-violent than violent, a 
third and final step should be applied.  This final step extends 
extraterritorial effect to fraud and cyber attacks against the U.S. 
government or its citizens.213  In addition, under this approach, 
conspiracies to commit fraud, cyber attacks, or violent acts could only 
apply extraterritorially if the conspirator was a national of the United 
States, which directly follows the Court’s opinion in Bowman.214  If the 
conduct in question falls under one of these categories, then there is an 
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in the specific 
case. 
Therefore, to put the Modified-Exception Test in a simplified 
manner, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies strictly unless 
the primary purpose of the crime specifically targets the U.S. 
government or its citizens because of their status or perceived status as 
U.S. citizens.  If the act is inherently violent, then the statute may apply 
extraterritorially in the specific case.  If an act is not inherently violent, 
but falls under the category of fraud or a cyber attack, then the statute 
may also apply extraterritorially in the specific case.  Finally, 
conspiracies to commit any one of the previously mentioned acts may 
apply extraterritorially if committed by a national of the United States. 
Under this new extraterritorial test, criminal statutes may not always 
appear static.  In fact, it is entirely possible that several criminal statutes 
may be applied extraterritorially; nevertheless, overly abusive 
extraterritorial application is curbed by the specificity of the analysis.  
Additionally, this test does not presume statutes to be territorially flexible; 
rather, it adheres to the presumption against extraterritoriality while 
allowing for a specific exception.  This test, by placing a stronger 
                                                 
212 This approach, however, attempts to prevent extending universal jurisdiction over all 
terrorist attacks.  See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of 
granting universal jurisdiction over terrorism). 
213 Under this step, fraud and cyber crimes targeting corporations and organizations 
would be exempt from the exception unless they were committed because of the fact that 
the company had national ties to the United States. 
214 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (allowing some crimes against the 
United States to apply extraterritorially, “especially if committed by its own citizens, 
officers, or agents”). 
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emphasis on the violent nature of an act, also allows for more immediate 
justice when an act has resulted in irreversible damage. 
The Modified-Exception Test, while referring to Bowman, is different 
in two important ways.  First, it does not force courts to painstakingly 
determine the territorial locus of a statute.215  It instead focuses on the 
action and the purpose of the action, not the location.  Second, the Test 
does not grant a statute extraterritorial effect.216  Instead, it evaluates 
crimes on a case-by-case basis and only allows extraterritoriality when 
the circumstances around the conduct adequately meet the requirements 
of the Modified-Exception Test.217 
An argument could be made that such a test is unnecessary because 
courts’ current approach to interpreting criminal statutes is adequate, 
and if extraterritorial application is wrongly interpreted, then Congress 
will provide for clarification.218  While this may be true, the Modified-
Exception Test fills in perceived holes of the current approach.  First, the 
current approach assumes that Congress is properly informed of every 
instance in which a court allows a statute to apply extraterritorially.219  
This is a large assumption and can result in damaging determinations by 
lower courts when their precedent influences future treatment of the 
statute.220  Second, the modern approach of loosely applying 
extraterritoriality while relying on Congress to alleviate any confusion 
after a decision promotes judicial activism rather than the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.221  This is exactly what the Supreme Court was 
                                                 
215 See id. at 97–98 (holding that to determine whether a statute applies extraterritorially, 
courts must examine the “locus” of the crime). 
216 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how extraterritoriality is 
dependent upon statutory construction and is not a case-by-case decision). 
217 Such an approach is beneficial because it allows the United States to adequately 
protect its national security interests without being overly restrained by statutory 
construction.  At the same time, it also prevents courts from aggressively applying federal 
laws extraterritorially when national security concerns or congressionally determined 
public policy implications are not triggered. 
218 See supra note 126 (discussing how Congress’s unwillingness to amend statutes after 
they have been territorially interpreted by the courts demonstrates Congress’s tacit 
approval of such interpretation). 
219 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–98 (1979) (stating that the Supreme 
Court presumes that Congress is aware of its decisions).  But see Eskridge, supra note 159, at 
337 n.12 (stating that Congress is usually unaware of lower court decisions). 
220 See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (relying on 
previous precedent in determining the extraterritorial reach of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1117, 
despite the absence of any “explicit extraterritorial provision” within the statutes). 
221 See supra notes 135–37 (explaining how tactics, such as localization, promote judicial 
activism and creativity); see also supra note 184 (discussing the dangers of judicial activism).  
Judicial activism is regularly used to obtain extraterritoriality, even though such activism is 
often considered dangerous when decisions implicate foreign nations.  See supra notes 183–
84 and accompanying text.  Courts may face the “overarching philosophical problems” of 
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attempting to curb in Morrison.222  The Modified-Exception Test follows 
the “clear statement” rule regarding the presumption against 
extraterritoriality,223 while providing a loophole for circumstances where 
national security is actually threatened without relying on malleable 
statutory interpretation or the international principles of law.224  By 
evaluating the presumption against extraterritoriality with a vigorous 
“clear statement” rule, courts give Congress increased notice regarding 
the structural limitations of statutes.225  Finally, the Modified-Exception 
Test grants deference to the national security of the United States and its 
citizens and promotes the goals of the nation when it is at its most 
vulnerable. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts’ extraterritorial treatment of geographically silent federal 
statutes has become increasingly liberal over the last several years to the 
extent that the presumption against extraterritoriality is sometimes 
merely a mirage—especially within the context of criminal statutes.  
While this could be seen as increased vigilance, it, in actuality, is over-
application, and courts have begun to take it upon themselves to frame 
public policy and foreign relations.226  Facially, the Morrison decision 
attempts to curb liberal territorial readings of statutes that are silent in 
their territorial scope by reaffirming the controlling nature of the 
presumption; however, lower courts have been sluggish in following the 
principle literally and it is often lost in criminal cases.  While justice may 
sometimes be served, it comes at the cost of judicial activism and the 
normalization of manipulative statutory interpretation. 
A strict, specific exception to the presumption is imperative to 
adequately respond to emergency situations involving breaches of 
national security.  The growth in technology, transport, and 
telecommunications has led to new and innovative ways for criminals to 
place the United States and its citizens at risk.  While globalism often 
                                                                                                             
knowledge, conduct, and governance when reviewing national security laws and policy, 
and oftentimes they are not in a position to adequately address these problems.  Blomquist, 
supra note 31, 452–53. 
222 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
223 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (promoting a strict 
reading of the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
224 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (using extraterritoriality to allow 
the government to protect itself). 
225 Unlike the Court in Morrison, the Modified-Exception Test would advocate the use of 
statutory content, such as “this law applies abroad.”  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
226 See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (discussing how courts attempt to 
frame public policy concerns when they apply geoambiguous laws extraterritorially). 
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requires extraterritoriality to effectively combat international issues, 
generously applying federal laws in such a way may violate 
international laws, as well as personal and national sovereignty.  Thus, it 
has become increasingly difficult for courts to juxtapose the insurance of 
national security with the presumption against extraterritoriality.  A new 
approach must be adopted that simultaneously preserves the 
presumption and adequately addresses extraterritorial activity causing 
immediate harm to the nation and its citizens.  Rather than the current 
all-or-nothing approach to statutory interpretation, courts should follow 
the Modified-Exception Test, which endorses a clear statement rule 
regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality while providing a 
loophole for unforeseeable or destructive conduct that specifically 
targets the United States and its citizens.  Such an approach preserves the 
legal tradition of the presumption against extraterritoriality and ensures 
that justice will be served when an actor harms national security and 
attempts to hide behind territorially ambiguous federal laws. 
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